Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition 

Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist TraditionAnna Tropia: Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6Daniel Heider, Andersen Claus A.Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition Anna Tropia Introduction The distinction elaborated by John Duns Scotus between intuitive and abstractive cognition aims to define two diverse kinds of cognitive acts : the first actualizes the cognition of a thing insofar as it is present and existent ( e. g., my act of seeing the cup of coffee that my friend just brought to my table ); the second actualizes the cognition of something that is not present and that is, so to say, ‘presentified’ by a medium ( e. g., my act of seeing a type of coffee in the menu of a coffee-shop counter). 1 The second kind of cognitive act is characterized by the presence of this medium (in my example, the entry in the menu ), which Scotus, along with a strong and well-represented medieval tradition, calls ‘species.’ 2 In the case of intuitive cognition, the entire path of knowledge, meant as a long refining process that goes from the external material world to the inner immaterial domain of the mind, is shortened, and the cognitive capacities of the mind are drastically augmented : there is no need for any mediation between the mind and its cognitive objects, since the former is capable of grasping them directly. The success of this distinction after Scotus is well-known : it permeates the philosophical lexicon and ‘intuitive cognition’ remains, up to Descartes and even later, the synonym of a direct, non-mediated and perfect kind of cognition. In- This work was supported by the Czech Sciences Foundation, financing the project “Intentionality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” ( GAČR 21-08256S ), as well as by the European Regional Development Fund-Project “Creativity and Adaptability as Conditions of the Success of Europe in an Interrelated World” (No. CZ.02.1.01/ 0.0/ 0.0/ 16_019/ 0000734 ). 1 Regarding intuitive cognition, see the classical works by Day, Intuitive Cognition ; Dumont, “The Scientific Character of Theology ; ” and Wolter, “Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals” ( contains an overview of the passages in which Scotus makes use of this distinction ); Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 78 -84. See further Pasnau, “Cognition,” 296 - 300, and Pini, “Scotus on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition” and “Duns Scotus on What is in the Mind,” 330 - 39. 2 The literature on species theory is extensive. I limit myself to refer to the classical works by Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3 - 75 ; Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, as well as to some more recent publications : Pini, “Il dibattito sulle specie intelligibili ; ” Perler, “Things in the Mind” and Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter ; Spruit, “Species, Sensible and Intelligible,” 1211- 12. terestingly, it is the abstractive kind of cognition that seems to become ‘old’ in early modern times. In the wake of Ockham, many are those who claim that the intellect is able to grasp its cognitive objects directly, bypassing the mediation of the species. The same ‘modern’ tendency is embraced by a Scotist philosopher and theologian, a couple of generations after Descartes. In his three-volume work Collationes doctrinae Sancti Thomae et Scoti, cum differentiis inter utrumque ( Padua, 1671, 1673, 1680 ), the Augustinian Francisco Macedo ( Coimbra 1596 -Padua 1681) offers a confused account of angelic abstractive and intuitive cognition of material objects. Confused, insofar as, in following his project, it is hard to tell if the angelic mind knows the worldly objects through or without species. Macedo models the angelic acts of intuitive cognition upon human abstractive acts of cognition. The use of the term ‘species,’ as it will be shown, is at the origin of this confusion. But the result is clear : Macedo aims to model the angelic model of cognition on the human one, thereby eliminating almost all the differences between the angelic and the human mind. 3 This early modern Scotist account of cognition is indeed sui generis. It is not in line with the debates of more famous Scotists, like Mastri and Belluto, and seems to rely upon other theories of cognition, especially one that was endorsed by some Jesuits. In this paper, (1) Macedo himself will shortly be presented ; I shall then examine his accounts of human (2 ) and angelic (3 ) cognition ; finally (4 ), some sources that possibly constitute Macedo’ s background will be presented in order to shed some light on the tradition he follows. 1. Francisco Macedo and His Collationes Francisco Macedo is indeed an eclectic figure. 4 He lived his life in the manner of some intellectual ‘knight-errant,’ as Pierre Bayle put it. 5 Born in Coimbra, he attended the courses given there by the famous Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548 - 1617 ). In the Collationes, Macedo says that it was from him that he learned freedom of thought and independence from the Thomist party : I remember that Suárez ( who, when I was a student, gave public lectures at the famous university of Coimbra and had the task of reading Aquinas ), when the Thomists told him that he had either to stick firmly to Aquinas’ s word or to stop commenting on him, 3 I present this thesis in Tropia, La teoria della conoscenza di Francesco Macedo. 4 For biographical information on Macedo, see Troilo, “Franciscus a S. Augustino Macedo,” and Sousa Ribeiro, Francisco Macedo. On his teaching activity in Padua, see Baù, “P. Francesco Macedone e P. Antonio Maria Bianchi.” See also Ventosa, “Der Scotismus,” 376 -83. 5 Cf. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1951B -C : “C’étoit un ésprit ardent, et assez universel, et qui a eu beaucoup des querelles […]. La république des lettres a ses breteurs ; Macedo en étoit un.” 178 Anna Tropia said : “I will stop commenting on him.” That he did : from then on, he stopped commenting on Aquinas. Mindful of this event, I found shelter among the supporters of Scotus ; I fight for Scotus. 6 Independence and unsettledness mark his path. Having been a member of the Society of Jesus, Macedo changes his religious order by joining the Franciscans. After a period of traveling in Italy and France, as ambassador of the King of Portugal, he finally enters the order of the Discalced Augustinians. The Collationes doctrinae Sancti Thomae et Scoti is a formidable comparison of the whole Thomist system with Scotus’ s. The work follows the order of the first three books of Peter Lombard’ s Sentences, and point by point compares Aquinas and Scotus on selected questions and problems. In the note to the reader, quoted above, in which he attributes to Suárez the merit of having taught him independency of thought, Macedo also claims to belong to Scotus’ s party and to fight to defend the Subtle Doctor’ s thought ( pro Scoto pugno ). His adherence to Scotism, however, is quite peculiar, as we shall see. His defense of Scotus is more of an attack on Aquinas’ s positions presented in an Augustinian-flavored sauce than a faithful commentary on Scotus’ s texts. 2. Human Cognition Following the order of the Sentences, Macedo reserves the treatment of human cognition to the first part of his work. The occasion is provided by the question concerning the intellect’ s first object. In this context, Macedo formulates very clearly his criticism of Aquinas - less clearly his defense of Scotus. After reporting the texts by Aquinas concerned with the human intellect’ s first object ( STh I, q. 12, art. 4 and q. 84, art. 7 ) and Scotus’ s texts from Ordinatio ( passages from I, dist. 3, q. 3 ), Macedo makes two moves. The first is that of equalizing Aquinas’ s position on the cognitive priority of the essences of material things ( quidditates rerum materialium ) with Scotus’ s position on the cognitive priority of being qua being : despite their use of different terms, both philosophers aimed to define what is the first object understood by the human intellect. 7 The second is to use 6 Macedo, Collationes I, Preface ( Lectori curioso ), unpaginated : “Accidit mihi quid Suario ; quem memini me puero cum ille Conimbrice in illustri illa Academia palam doceret, et S. Thomam ex instituto commentaretur, audire interdum a Thomistis ut vel a S. Thoma non recederet, aut eum commentari desineret : eumque respondere. Desinam deinceps commentari. Quod praestitit. Exinde quippe abstinuit a commentariis. Memor huius eventus ad Scoti me castra recepi. Pro Scoto pugno.” Collationes I refers to the first volume of the work, Collationes II to the second ; each volume is divided into several collationes. 7 Cf. Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 1, 76a - b : “Sic refert Scotus sententiam S. Thomae, ac eam incipit oppugnare. Quoad primum bene, ac fideliter egit, nec eum Thomista, quod sciam, quispiam in eo reprehendit. Nam licet S. Thomas quaestionem propriis, ac diversis Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 179 Aquinas’ s principle of proportion ( each mind cognizes something according to the state it has : e. g., the human soul is the form of a material body, therefore, it is proportionate to cognizing the essences or forms of the material things ) to make the following point : as the intellect is immaterial, its nature cannot be proportioned to cognizing material bodies ( nor their essences ). The principle of proportion is used against Thomas in order to expand and augment the capacities of the intellect : According to Aquinas the first and adequate object of the human intellect is the quiddity of material being. First object : because the intellect, which is immersed in matter, receives its species from the senses, and knows first the material objects ; adequate : for, although the intellect knows what is deprived of matter, such cognition is grasped only by making abstraction from the matter in which the intellect is immersed. And, according to Aquinas, the intellect is imprisoned in the prison of matter. 8 According to Macedo, the principle of proportion functions only if the focus is completely on the immaterial nature of the intellect, regardless of its state : By its nature, the intellect is spiritual and immaterial ; by its nature, it requires a proportionate cognition : that of the spiritual and immaterial substances. These are the substances the intellect desires to know by its nature and, by its nature, it knows them. Both philosophers [Aquinas and Scotus ] agree on the first claim, for, Aquinas always believed the proportion between the essence of a substance and its cognitive capacity - between the faculty and the object - to be necessary. Secondly, the cognition of the immaterial and spiritual substances corresponds by nature to the spiritual and immaterial nature of the intellect. This follows from the first claim. One can object that the state in which the intellect is, makes it dependent on the senses as well as on the phantasms […] this is claimed by the Angelic Doctor and Cajetan along with other Thomists. 9 Scoti verbis posuerit. Tamen sensus est idem. [….] Et quanquam [Thomas ] non dicat adaequatum, sed solum proprium, recte ex hoc sequitur, cum id sit proprium quarto modo, ut apparet ex adductis exemplis naturae lapidis, et equi.” 8 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 1, 76b : “Liquet ergo ex his sensisse D. Thomam obiectum primum, et adaequatum esse quidditatem rei materialis. Primum, quia intellectus immersus in materiam accipit species a sensibus, et immediate cognoscit materialia ; adaequatum, quia etsi cognoscat immaterialia, ea non abstrahendo a materia in qua versatur, agnoscit ; unde stringitur, et clauditur in materiae carceribus.” 9 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff.1, sec. 1, 77a - b : “Natura intellectus est omnino spiritualis, et immaterialis, et natura sua exigit cognitionem sibi proportionatam, haec est rerum spiritualium, et immaterialium ; ergo eas naturaliter cupit agnoscere, et cognoscit. Maior est certa quoad utramque partem, ac conformis S. Thomae, qui requirit semper proportionem essentiae, et intelligentiae, potentiae, et obiecti. Minor patet, et quia natura spiritualis, et immaterialis respondet obiectis spiritualibus, et immaterialibus ; consequentia est in forma. Sed. Obijcitur status in quo est intellectus dependens a sensibus, et addictus phantasmatibus, […] uti argumentatur Doctor Angelicus et Caietanus cum Reliquis Thomistis.” 180 Anna Tropia The term ‘state’ recalls indeed Scotus’ s distinction between the present state (the status praesentis vitae ), in which the intellect is joined to the body, and the afterlife (the status ille ), in which the union between soul and body will be broken - and, as Scotus suggests in diverse cases, the human cognitive capacities will be restored. 10 Yet, interestingly, the distinction among the states of the human intellect is ignored by Macedo throughout his work. 11 Differently from Scotus, who distinguished the capacity of the intellect as a power ( natura potentiae ) in general from its current state, Macedo seems to proceed only with regard to the first and to be oblivious of the second state. In the above-mentioned passage, he refers to Aquinas and the principle of proportion as a limitation of the human cognitive extension. Macedo there claims that not only the human intellectual capacity includes the cognition of the immaterial substances, but also that it is unfettered by any state. Macedo plainly holds that the human intellect does not depend on the senses for the acquisition of knowledge. This last point constitutes a leitmotiv, since Macedo repeats it on every possible occasion : the intellect does not depend on the phantasms. To sum up briefly, according to Macedo : 1) The human intellect knows first the immaterial substances. 2 ) The proportion between knower and known is not necessary ( or : ‘proportionate’ is not understood in the same way as Aquinas conceived it). 3 ) The intellect does not depend on the senses to acquire cognition (no conversio ad phantasmata ). 4 ) The agent intellect is the main instrument through which human beings acquire every kind of cognition. What clearly emerges from this picture, is Macedo’ s intention to highlight the autonomy of the intellect in the process of knowledge acquisition : 10 Famously, Scotus does not decide whether the limitations of the human mind in the present state follow from original sin - which would have frustrated the intellective capacities by making them less operative - or from the natural connection of the soul’ s powers, namely from the connection of the intellective soul with the body. Cf. in particular Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 187 ( ed. Vat. I), 113 - 14 ; Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 14, q. 3, n. 123 ( ed. Vat. IX), 473 - 74 ; Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q. 19, n. 18 ( OPh V), 190 - 91, and ibid., q. 21, n. 38 ( OPh V), 224 - 25. The distinction between the two states has consequences in Scotus’ s thought, and is evoked each time he wants to underline the imperfection of the human nature. See Dumont, “Scotus’ Intuition Viewed in the Light of the Intellect’ s Present State,” and “The Role of Phantasm in the Psychology of Duns Scotus ; ” Pasnau, “Cognition,” 293 - 96 ; Pini, “Scotus on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 352 - 54. 11 Macedo was not alone in this ; according to Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 159 - 203, Scotus’ s distinction was either ignored or completely transformed by the Scotists of the seventeenth century. Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 181 The intellect rejects, does not receive the sensible and material species. It abstracts and forms immaterial intelligible species from them, leaving them and preserving the latter ; it thinks through them. […] this is not a turn ( conversio ) [to ] but a departure ( aversio ) from matter, a rejection of the material thing and a turn towards immaterial ones, that it immediately grasps and cognizes. 12 This autonomy is entirely justified by the presence of the agent intellect, which is capable of actively engaging itself in the acquisition of knowledge and enables the mind to cognize. Macedo has two arguments to prove that the agent intellect is independent from matter, both of which stem from a comparison of the human agent intellect with that of the separate soul and of the angel’ s soul. The fact that both of these latter are deprived of bodies, but are attributed an agent intellect, shows that the intellect as such can exert its dynamic power and gather cognition independently from the senses and sensible material species. The soul has an agent intellect, so that it can separate what is immaterial from what is material and make the cognitive object proportionate to the patient intellect […]. If the separate soul too has an agent intellect, as it is commonly stated by common opinion, it is clear that, by its nature, the intellect cognizes without making any use of phantasms and that it does not depend on them ; nor does the union with matter fetter its perfection or its natural way of cognizing. The proper object of the intellect thus is not the quiddity of material beings, but the quiddity of what is universal and immaterial. Nothing material can serve as medium or as ratio cognoscendi of an immaterial thing ; but the immaterial thing itself is the medium and the ratio cognoscendi of material things, like in the case of the angel ( sicut in angelo ), who understands the material objects by means of immaterial species. 13 Two things are worth noting. First of all, Macedo’ s insistence in underlining the human intellect’ s behavioral resemblance with the separate soul’ s and the angel’ s. He basically equates them. Macedo seems to portray some unique mind, regardless of what could be its subject. If one then asks, what this agent intellect 12 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 77b : “[…] intellectus reijcit, non recipit illas species sensibiles, et materiales, et ex illas abstrahit, et format species intelligibiles immateriales, illas relinquens, has retinens, et per has immediate intelligens. […] nec illa est conversio, sed aversio a materia, et reiectio rei materialis, et conversio ad res immateriales, quas immediate attingit, et cognoscit.” 13 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 77b - 78a : “[D]atur intellectus agens in anima, ut secernat materiale ab immateriali, et faciat obiectum proportionatum intellectui patienti […]. [ S ]i intellectus agens datur in anima separata, uti communis opinio fert, manifeste patet ex natura sua intellectum cognoscere sine ulla dependentia, et recursu ad phantasmata, et illum statum societatis cum materia nihil detrahere eis perfectioni, nec modo naturali cognoscendi. Igitur non est eis obiectum quidditas rei materialis, sed quidditas rei universalis, et immaterialis, nec res materialis est medium, et ratio cognoscendi materiales, sicut in angelo, qui virtute, et opera specierum immaterialium intelligit res materiales.” 182 Anna Tropia is, or has, or does, the answer is provided by its very activity : the agent intellect is a force belonging to the human soul ( but also to the angelic intellect and the separate soul), which has the capacity to separate material and immaterial features in cognitive objects, and to make cognition actual. Such activity was traditionally attributed by Scotus - and the Scotists - also to separate souls and angels. 14 The second remarkable element is the confusion that Macedo’ s text transmits : he seems to describe a sort of mirror-game between the human and the angelic and separate mind, although this is not clearly explained at all. How does the human intellect acquire knowledge of the world independently from the senses and sensible species ? What are the immaterial substances acquired by the human intellect ? We will see that Macedo’ s comparison of the human intellect with the angelic one - or the separate soul’ s - describes, in a sort of back-andforth movement, how the human intellect cognizes ( without depending on sensible species, like the angel does ) but also how the angel cognizes the material world by means of an immaterial medium. Does this mean that the angel and the human intellect cognize the world in the same way, namely through intelligible species ? In one passage, Macedo claims that the only difference between the angel and the human soul is that “the angelic species are infused by God, whereas the human species are acquired.” 15 If we consider the problem of the intellect’ s first object, and the principle of proportion revised by Macedo, what is this object that is acquired, immaterial ( as the intellect’ s nature commands ), and known without dependency on the species ? These questions remain open until the treatment of the angelic intellect in the second volume of the Collationes ; they are, for the most part, permeated by his anti-Thomist polemical and rhetorical tones. What is possible to say so far is the following. 1) According to Macedo, the human intellect’ s first object includes/ are the immaterial objects. 2 ) His main reasons are : a ) that the intellect’ s immateriality requires it (revised proportion principle ); that b ) the active nature of the intellect supports this view ; c ) that the nature of the intellect( s ) is basically the same : equation of conjoined, separate, and angelic intellect. 14 Cf. Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 78a : “Nam in probabili sententia intellectus agens datur in Angelo, sive distinctus, sive non a possibili, sicut in anima humana. Igitur sicut ille naturaliter intelligit spiritualia, et immaterialia immediate, et ex illis materialia, ita et homo cognoscit per suum intellectum res immateriales, ac per eas res materiales, et sensibiles […]. Equidem censeo nihil aliud interesse inter cognitionem angelicam ( omitto nobilitatem essendi) et humanam, nisi quod species angelicae sunt a Deo infusae, hominis vero acquisitae.” For a list of all the Scotists attributing to Scotus the claim that the angels have an agent intellect, see Macedo’ s doxography in Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 1, 155b. 15 See note 14. Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 183 3. Angelic Cognition Macedo deals with angelic cognition in the second part of his commentary to the Sentences. Concerning the cognition the angel has of the world, Macedo’ s account can be summarized as follows : 1) The angelic mind has a similar structure to the human one. 2 ) The angel has both an agent and a patient intellect ; it acquires knowledge directly from the objects. 3 ) In this regard, there is no difference between angels and human beings. Once again, the target of criticism is Aquinas. Macedo reproaches him for having construed an account of cognition that literally revolves around a “machine of proportions” ( machina proportionum ): 16 what a cognitive subject knows and how she knows it depends on her nature. This state-of-things determines the differences between diverse cognitive subjects, like human beings, separate souls, angels, blessed souls : the minds that populate Aquinas’ s world. Each, according to Macedo, has a precise cognitive modality : acquired species in the case of the human intellect, infused species in the case of the separate soul, innate species in the case of the angel, and a direct vision of the divine mind in the case of the blessed soul. 17 Macedo firmly rejects this system of proportions. According to him, the state of a subject does not determine her cognitive modalities nor her cognitive objects and, mostly, there is no proportion among the cognitive modalities of each subject. That is, how the human intellect knows is independent on how the angel or other subjects know. It does not follow from the union of the soul with the body that angels have infused species, because there is no connection between the two things ; the connection is rather 16 Macedo uses this expression in one of his arguments against Aquinas, after presenting the argument according to which angels too, can acquire species from the things ( and have not only innate ideas ): cf. Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 166b : “[…] quia in Deo sunt creaturae in ideis representatae in singulis singulae, quemadmodum toties ostendimus ; igitur et in speciebus angelicis debent omnia singillatim, et per singulas species repraesentari, sicut in nobis repraesentantur universalia universalibus, singularia singularibus : unde corruit tota machina proportionum, et accommodationum ordinate ad inducendam diversitatem Angeli ab homine per species innatas et acquisitas ; cum ex ratione ultima genuine S. Thomae, deducatur similitudo, et aequalitas cognoscendi omnia per species singillatim sumptas, et singulas res repraesentantas, sicut cognoscuntur a nobis. Utcunque sit certe illud exemplum non concludit : angelos cognoscere per species innatas et concreatas.” 17 Regarding the different modalities of cognition proper to each mind, see Scribano, Angeli e beati, 9 - 67. There is extensive literature on the blessed souls’ vision in God ; beside the referential work by Trottmann, La vision béatifique, see also Pini, “Il dibattito sulle specie intellegibili,” 281- 91, and Krause, Thomas Aquinas on Seeing God. 184 Anna Tropia between the way one is in the body and how the species are received through the body, for what concerns the soul ; this is the only proportion. But there is no connection between subjects of different order, like angels and souls, so that it is possible to say that, as the soul receives its species from the objects, the angel must receive them from God. It is correct to claim that, as it has no body, the angel does not receive the species from bodies, unlike souls ; but it is not correct to deduce from this that it receives them directly from God, for, there are also other ways to receive them. 18 Once again, Macedo defends not only the independence of each subject’ s cognitive modality from the others, but also from the state in which a cognitive subject is. Our scholastic is indeed married to the Scotist idea according to which angels have an agent intellect : this is the real difference in comparison with Thomas and his school. The attribution of an agent intellect and the agent intellect’ s specific nature in itself - namely, that of a dynamic force able to make potential cognition actual - not only enables the angels to acquire cognition but is also the main element upon which the entire analogy with the human intellect is based. Differently from Thomas, in fact, Scotus holds that the angel has a less actual nature, and therefore needs to acquire cognition. It is the case of contingent objects, as Macedo points out. 19 Moreover - and this is an argument that Macedo strongly emphasizes -, having an agent intellect is in no way a punishment, or something that negatively marks the nature of a subject : on the contrary, the agent intellect is a perfection, and is to be found in each created subject. The agent intellect is a perfection that does not depend on the subject that has it but a perfection in general and overall […]; it is thus worthy of the angel and can be attributed to it. […] By its nature, it is not something added to the compound of matter and form - the human being -, it is there only by accident, like when it is in the soul of our Lord Jesus and in the separate soul. Thus, it is free from that boundary and is to be found in each intellective subject, of any species, like in all the species of the angels. According to the perfection of their nature, angels are able to free the agent intellect from every material aggregate : they unite themselves to them only by accident. 20 18 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 165a : “Non ergo sequitur ex illa unione animae ad corpus illa infusio specierum in angelo, cum nulla sit connexio inter utrumque : connexio quidem est inter modum essendi in corpore, et recipiendi speciem per corpus respectu eiusdem animae, in qua est proportio : sed non est connexio inter duo diversi ordinis subiecta, angelum, et anima, dicendo : anima accipis species ab obiectis, ergo angelus accipit a Deo per infusionem. Bene sequitur angelus carens corpore non eas accipit a corpore, cui unitur sicuti anima, sed non sequitur : accipit immediate a Deo cum alii modi supersint accipiendi.” 19 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 2, 158a : “[…] non omnes species sunt congenitae angelo, cum multas ille de novo acquirat, quales sunt futurorum contingentium praesertim liberorum : secretorum cordis humani ; et illae quae ad angelicam locutionem pertinent, quae magna pars specierum est, ad quas necessarius omnino est intellectus agens […].” 20 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 3, 160a : “Intellectus agens est perfectio non respectiva ad subiectum, sed absoluta ab omni subiecto, ac per se, ac in se consideratus perfec- Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 185 Macedo gives a long and rhetorically rich peroration on the agent intellect’ s perfection, which goes hand in hand with the exaltation of human dignity. The main point is that it is not a sign of imperfection to acquire cognition. The cognitive model of the innate species, the one that Thomas attributes to the angels, is reserved only to the knowledge of things that are immutable, eternal and do not change. Scotus’ s text that Macedo here comments upon ( Ordinatio II, dist. 3, q. 11) is clear on this point : the angel has innate species of the objects considered as universals but not as singulars. The nature of the singular and individual impedes this : if the angel had innate species of things considered as universals ( e. g., the essence of cat, or cat-ness, namely what it is to be a cat) and as individuals ( e. g., all the individual cats existing in the world : my cat Camilla, my friend Michela’ s cat etc.), then the angel would actually need an infinite number of innate species. But there is more : Scotus combines the absurdity of having an infinite number of species with the peculiar and fleeting nature of the individual. 21 He clearly claims that the individuals must be understood by the angels as present, namely through an act of intuitive cognition. 22 This is exactly what it is tio ; ergo dignus angelo, et ponendus in angelo. […] natura sua non est addictus composito ex materia et forma, qualis est homo, nam id per accidens est illi, dum sit in anima Christi Domini et in anima separata. Igitur de se est liber ab illo vinculo et reperitur in omni subiecto intellectivo, cuiuscunque id specie fit, uti in omnibus speciebus angelorum, qui iuxta suae perfectionem naturae intellectum agentem sortiuntur ab omni concretione materiali liberum : quae illi per accidens accedit.” 21 Besides the already quoted works on the Scotist distinction and usage of intuitive and abstractive cognition, concerning his position on the singulars, see the classical work by Bérubé, La connaissance de l’ individuel au moyen âge, and the recent monograph by Lazella, The singular voice of being. 22 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 162a, quotes some passages from Scotus’ s question “An angeli possint proficere accipiendo cognitionem a rebus ? ,” where Scotus distinguishes between angelic abstractive cognition of the universals and angelic intuitive cognition of the singulars. Macedo does not quote but summarizes the following passage from Duns Scotus, In Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 11, n. 12 ( ed. Wadding VI.1), 493 : “Tertio dico, quod quantumcumque [Angelus ] haberet concreatam sibi notitiam singularis, et notitiam existentiae contingentis, tamen cognitionem intuitivam singularium necessario recipit a rebus. Non enim omnis cognoscens existentiam alicuius, cognoscit ipsam intuitive, quia potest ipsam cognoscere abstractive, nam cognitionem intuitivam singularium, non potest habere in Verbo, ubi tamen cognitionem existentiae habet, et ideo ad cognitionem intuitivam rei necessario concurrit objectum reale, vel ipsa res ut praesens.” This whole quaestio is not included in the Vatican edition ; according to Bazán, “Conceptions on the Agent Intellect and the Limits of Metaphysics,” 196, it is considered “an interpolated text coming from Rep. Paris. II B, dist. 11, q. 2.” In the same column, Macedo also quotes a text from the Reportata Parisiensia (II, dist. 3, q. 3, Wadding XI.1, 277 ) that allows him to formulate the discrepancy between Aquinas and Scotus as follows : “Itaque convenit Scotus cum D. Thoma in eo, quod Angelus habet species concreatas, 186 Anna Tropia meant, when we learn that the angel acquires cognition of certain objects that have certain characteristics - such as being contingent, mutable, individual, and, I would add, material. It knows them as actually present, and it knows them such as they are. Now, Macedo takes on Scotus’ s page ; but what is striking is that in his own pages, the discourse on the cognition of certain objects ( contingent, mutable etc.) is not linked to the angel’ s capacity of cognizing them through an act of intuitive cognition. Moreover, the term “intuitive” is not to be found at all within his commentary. Secondly, human cognition is the laboratory for explaining how the angels acquire cognition. Before clarifying how this happens, in fact, the Portuguese scholastic indulges in the description of the human process of acquiring cognition. Via acquired species, of course, and through the agent intellect’ s illumination : I think that the illuminative action of the intellect does not concern the phantasm but rather something that is produced after the phantasm. As the latter is at the base of the cognitive process, illumination concerns the intelligible species […] and the possible intellect : it is the possible intellect that receives the species thereby originating the cognitive process. […] The phantasm put aside ( secluso phantasmate ), [the agent intellect] illuminates the intelligible species by exciting them and making them ready in a first act to make the possible intellect think […]. It is therefore evident that, even without phantasm, there still is this illuminative activity of the agent intellect. 23 Macedo highlights how one of the activities traditionally attributed to the agent intellect - its “illuminative” act - does not concern the phantasm, the material image impressed by the object on the senses, but rather is directed towards the possible intellect, namely that part of the intellective faculty which “receives” intellectual contents and hence cognizes them. His aim is to underline the separation of the intellectual activity, which is characterized by its immateriality, from the domain of all that is material. Again, the phantasm is not deemed necessary in the production of an act of intellection, which instead seems to be something “happening” within the intellective faculty, and only there. The goal is to reveal the common ground between the embodied mind and the angelic one that is naturally deprived of a body : the more the human intellect is described as indesive ut dicit D. Thomas, connaturales rerum universalium : discrepant in eo, quod habet species concreatas etiam singularium, quod admittit D. Thomas, et negat Scotus.” 23 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 3, 159b : “Ego existimo illam illuminationem non esse praecise respectu phantasmatis, sed etiam respective ad illud dici, verum eo quoque sublato locum esse illuminationi respectu specie intelligibilis […] et intellectus possibilis, quatenus ei species ad intelligendum applicatur. […] secluso phantasmate illuminat species intelligibiles excitando eas, et proponendo illas expeditas in actu primo ad intelligendum intellectui possibili […]. Unde colligitur, licet non esset phantasma adhuc manere illam illustrationem factam ab intellectu agente.” Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 187 pendent from its body, the more the comparison with the angel becomes relevant. In the next section, which constitutes the very core of Macedo’ s account of both intellects, we finally find some clear statements regarding the species and the dependency of the human intellect on the body. Macedo explains what he deems to be the “whole knot of the difficulty” (totus nodus difficultatis ) 24 in the debate between the Scotists and the Thomists. According to Macedo, the Thomists claimed that angels possess innate species only, because they could not explain how an immaterial substance acquires cognition from material substances. 25 But certain objects do require such an interaction : What does not have any movement is innate and inborn [in the angelic mind ]; but what is subject to movement is or can be adventitious. In the constitution of the heaven nothing is mutable, because it is eternal […]. [ B ]ut the intelligible species augment and grow, like in the case of angelic language. Thus, the nature of the species is adventitious. 26 This text shows how Macedo thinks about the species : the nature of these instruments, whose task is to transmit information on the objects, is “adventitious”, and always entails a sort of exchange and interaction between the cognizer and the cognized object. What is here meant by ‘species’ might be an object of discussion and require some adjustment ; however, note, again, that there is no reference to an intuitive modality of cognition. To explain how the angelic intellect “abstracts” cognition from material objects, Macedo develops his comparison with the human intellect. In this occasion, he finally provides more information about the human process of knowledge acquisition : In order to become spiritual, the fantastic species is not subordinated to the agent intellect but to fantasy ; but it receives immateriality from the spiritual agent intellect. From this, I deduce that, in order for the material species to become spiritual, it must not be received within the spiritual power - which is impossible. The sole necessary thing is that this species unites itself with the intellective power and becomes ready to receive a 24 Cf. Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 2, diff. 4, sec. 5, 170a : “Hic est totius nodus difficultatis : quem quia Scoti adversarij solvere non audent, nec solutionem eius audire volunt : haerent, et adhaerent suae de speciebus concreatis sententiae, negant igitur inveniri posse modum probabilem, quo species ab extra praesertim materiales advenire angelo possint, qui omnino spiritualis cum sit, eas recipere nullo modo potest.” 25 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 2, 163b : “Hanc partem […], quem ponit contraria Scoti, qui non videtur intelligibilis, nedum probabilis, cum intelligi nequeat, quomodo res materiales possint immittere species in intellectum rei spiritualis […].” 26 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 164a - b : “Ea in quibus non est mutatio sunt innata, et coniuncta : quae vero mutationem subeunt, ea sunt, et possunt esse adventitia. Tunc : in coeli constitutione nihil est mutabile, cum sit aeternum […]. At vero species intelligibiles, et augentur, et crescunt, ut apparet in locutione angelica ; itaque earum specierum natura est adventitia.” 188 Anna Tropia sort of weakening ( attenuatio ) and refinement ( subtilizatio ). We see it in the case of the fantastic species, that is not received in the agent intellect but, remaining in phantasy, becomes immaterial after the agent intellect’ s adapted treatment and appropriation ( accommodatio ). 27 One more time, Macedo defends the view according to which the interaction between the material domain - represented by the fantastic species or the material phantasm - and the immaterial one - represented by the intellect - is impossible. In the passage quoted above, he claims that the phantasm “remains” within the fantasy and that the intellect does not in any way alter it. Nevertheless, there is room for a sort of interaction between the phantasm and the intellect : as a result of their encounter, the former is made “subtler.” How this happens is clarified in the following passage : I don’ t see what should prevent the angel from uniting itself to species and adapt to be abstracted ; nor why the angel should not be able to produce immaterial species of material objects ; for, angels move and are moved, act and are acted upon by heavy material bodies, to which they are intimately and directly united. Therefore, it is clear that also angels can be associated to those very subtle species that are more intentional than real and that through them, they acquire the species of material objects. If this required an internal and local union, it would not be different than saying that the angelic mind unites itself to those species through a sort of sympathy or internal proximity with those material species, so that they can serve to the task of that production. 28 Macedo’ s argument runs as follows : let us start by the presupposition that angels interact with bodies. They interact with them by maintaining their fully spiritual nature but, just like human beings, they are able to produce (thanks to their agent intellect) species that are “more intentional than real.” Through them, 27 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 5, 171a - b : “[ Species phantastica ] ad hoc ut spiritualizetur non subiectatur in intellectu agente, sed in phantasia, et tamen recipit ab intellectu agente spirituali immaterialitatem. Unde deduco non esse necessariam receptionem speciei materialis in potentia spirituali, quam puto impossibilem, ut evadat spiritualis, sed tantum, ut apte coniungatur, et accommodetur ad recipiendam illam attenuationem, et subtilizationem ; quemadmodum vidimus in exemplo specie phantasticae, quaecunque illa fit, quae non recepta intra intellectum agentem, sed manens intra phantasiam recipit immaterialitatem ab illo propter debitam applicationem, et accommodationem.” 28 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 5, 172a : “Quomodo autem angelus uniri possit illis speciebus apte ad eas elevandas, et cum ijs elevates speciem in se immaterialem producendam exponere, non video qua possit ratione negari, cum constet Angelos movere, et moveri, et agere, et agi cum corporibus maxime crassis, et materialibus, et immediate, et intime ijs coniungi. Unde liquet posse eos cum subtilissimis ijs formis, quae potius sunt intentionales, quam reales uniri, et simul cum ijsdem productiones specierum materialium efficere. An autem ad id necesse sit localis et intima coniuncio nihil interest utrum dicas : dummodo obtineas posse per intimam quondam, vel propinquitatem, vel sympathiam cum ijs materialibus speciebus coniungi ad officium illud productionis praestandum.” Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 189 they acquire knowledge (the species ) of material objects. Eventually, Macedo says that we can conceive of such union, or interaction, as a local one, “a sort of sympathy” or “an internal proximity.” There are of course many points left unclear. What does Macedo refer to, when he talks about ‘species’? If he were following Scotus faithfully (thereby embracing the doctrine of intuitive cognition, so, no species at all), ‘species’ would be a synonym of cognition or knowledge. In this case, the angel would be able to acquire cognition of material objects owing to its agent intellect, without medium, and through its sole capacity. Yet, Macedo talks of species that are “more intentional than real.” They belong more to a cognitive domain than to the external and material world. The human acquisition of species is a process that goes from the objects to the mind via a medium (the species ) that is appropriate and adequate to the nature of the latter. But, in the case of Macedo, no full explanation of how this acquisition happens is provided. We only learn that the phantasms are deemed incapable of exerting a direct influence upon the mind. The reference to ‘sympathy’ is helpful to solve the question. Although it is brief and not fully delineated, Macedo’ s way of sketching human ( and angelic ) cognition could be seen as moving toward a theory of cognition with a full-fledged account of sympathy. Famously, Macedo’ s former professor, Francisco Suárez, exposed in his De anima the doctrine according to which each soul’ s faculty acts separately from the others, but is “informed” of the activities of the others through their common root, i. e., the soul. 29 Suárez explains the production of the intelligible species through this mechanism : when the sensitive faculty is engaged in the cognition of a material object through the production of a material species, at the same time the intellect is stimulated to produce an intelligible species entirely on its own, and without contact with the world. 30 The whole process is possible because the two faculties are rooted in the same soul. If we go back to the case of the angels, which Macedo deals with, sympathy does not refer to diverse faculties of the soul - like in the case of human beings, who are provided with imagination and intellect -, but to the intellect and the external world. Angels react to the presence of the material objects by producing an intentional species of them - by grasping their ideas - without engaging with them. This explanation might fill in the blanks left by Macedo in his own account of human and angelic cognition. Human beings acquire intellectual cognition 29 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 8, 90. 30 Regarding the production of the intelligible species and sympathy in Suárez, cf. Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 301- 3 ; South, “Suárez on imagination” and “Singular and Universal in Suárez”; Perler, “Suárez on intellectual cognition and occasional causation”; Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy.” As for the production of the sensible species, see Daniel Heider’ s contribution to this present volume. 190 Anna Tropia through the sympathy among intellect and imagination ( or fantasy ); similarly, angels have a sort of sympathy with material and singular objects that enables them to produce a species of them. Macedo’ s account is, eventually, rather peculiar. Intuition might still seem to be lurking in the background as a possibility, somehow tied to the necessary interaction of the angelic mind with objects that are present and existent in the moment they are cognized. However, Macedo talks about species. If he uses the term as synonym for ‘cognition’ or for ‘ideas,’ then he subscribes to a tendency common to those scholastics, who deny the existence of the species but keep using the term as a synonym for ‘cognition’ ( see chapter 4 ). If he talks about species as something capable of actualizing the angelic mind, then he presses the comparison with the human mind ; cognition may then, in both cases, be described in occasionalist terms. To summarize : 1) Macedo claims that the angels acquire cognition of material objects like human beings do. 2 ) They do so by ‘species.’ 3 ) By ‘species,’ he either refers to the immaterial species of the material objects or to objects themselves, insofar as they are cognized. 4 ) The interaction between the material domain and the immaterial mind of the angel is quickly explained through sympathy, a form of occasionalism that Suárez and others employed in order to account for the human acquisition of the species. 4. A Jesuit Background ? In the Collationes, Macedo has Scotus’ s text in mind. Sometimes, he reappraises it literally, like in the defense of human dignity against the Thomistic account of different minds. Sometimes, he follows it more loosely, like it happens in his account of human and angelic cognition. Explaining cognition through a unique model of mind is not something alien to Scotus, according to whom there is no specific difference between the angelic and the human mind. 31 Nevertheless, in Macedo’ s account of angelic cognition, which is modeled on human cognition, and, first of all, in his confusion regarding intuitive and abstractive kinds of cognitive acts, one hears echoes from other traditions. 32 Macedo writes the Colla- 31 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. II dist. 1 q. 6, d. I ( ed. Vat. VII), 156 - 57. Cf. Macedo’ s commentary in Collationes II, coll. 1, diff. 2, Iudicium, 17a : “Equidem iudico non esse improbabilem sententiam affirmantem Animam rationalem equalem esse Angelo in essentiali perfectione.” 32 I have argued in favor of a partial reappraisal of Scotus by the Jesuits, specifically in the case of Suárez ; cf. Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy” and “McCaghwell’ s Reading of Scotus’ s De anima.” That Jesuits mixed up traditions and interpretations is generally accepted Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 191 tiones thirty years after Descartes published the Meditations. As Maritain has aptly put it, the French philosopher described the human mind by attributing to it most of the features Thomas Aquinas attributed to the angelic one. 33 But Macedo’ s confusion between the two minds or, better, between the two models of mind, does not originate in the Meditations. The two aspects that most significantly characterize his account of cognition - namely, the independence of the intellect from the senses and the similarity between angelic and human mind - rather seem to echo some elements that are traceable in the early Jesuit discussions. As already mentioned, one may reasonably assume that texts like Suárez’ s De anima may have cast a long shadow on the Collationes. The separation between the intellect’ s activities from the sensible faculty’ s is a recurring element in Jesuit texts since the very beginning of the Society’ s philosophical and pedagogical production. Suárez introduced the mechanism of the connection of the soul’ s faculties to explain the independency of the intellect from the senses : Fantasy and intellect are rooted in the same ( human ) soul, and for this reason there is a natural order and consonance in their activities. For example, the object that is known by the intellect, is also known by fantasy. If on the one hand the possible intellect has no species, on the other the soul has the spiritual capacity of producing the species of the things that are cognized by the senses in the possible intellect. In this process, the sensible imagination exerts no efficient causal role but is almost like matter ( quasi materia ), namely that which stimulates the soul, or an exemplar. So, in the very moment the soul knows an object via fantasy, its spiritual capacity paints that very object in the possible intellect. […] The agent intellect, as such, has no other action than producing the intelligible species, despite the fact that this process has been called in many ways. Notice that a triple activity is usually attributed to the agent intellect : (1) the illumination of the phantasm ; (2 ) making things actually intelligible and (3 ) abstracting from the phantasms. […] Actually, the illumination of the phantasm doesn’ t directly concern the phantasm […], it is rather directed toward the potential intellect. But the agent intellect has no other operation, regarding the potential intellect, than that of producing the intelligible species. 34 in scholarship ; for an overview of their internal regulations and pedagogical plans, see Casalini, “The Jesuits.” 33 See Maritain, “Descartes ou l’ incarnation de l’ ange”, 75 - 126. Maritain’ s intuition has been reappraised and developed by Scribano, Angeli e beati, 119 - 93. Scribano’ s important book has been recently translated into French ; cf. Scribano, Anges et bienheureux : la connaissance de l’ infini de Descartes à Spinoza. 34 Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 12, 96, and nn. 14 - 15, 98 : “[ P ]hantasiam et intellectum hominis radicari in una anima ; et hinc est quod in suis operibus habent ordinem et consonantiam ; unde patebit, infra, quod eo ipso quod intellectus operatur, etiam imaginatio operatur. Ad hunc ergo modum arbitror intellectum possibilem de se esse nudum speciebus, habere tamen animam virtutem spiritualem ad efficiendas species earum rerum, quas sensus cognoscit, in intellectu possibili, ipsa imaginatione sensibili non concurrente effective ad eam 192 Anna Tropia In these quotes, Suárez has the same concerns as those that will occupy Macedo. Just like the latter shall do, Suárez denies the possibility of any direct contact or exchange between the domain of sensibility and that of the intellect ; the intellective act is described as something that affects the very intellect. The two parts of the soul participating in the act of cognition are thus separate, and communicate only through their common root, the soul. The passage of abstraction is thus redefined, and the role of the intellect amplified, in a certain sense, with respect to that of the sensitive faculty. 35 Moreover, in Suárez’ s De anima, the attention given to this epistemological problem - the interaction between sensitive and intellective faculty - is extensive, and the discussion of problems and sources seem to precede, somehow, the long defense of the human intellect’ s independence that we know from Macedo’ s text. Both scholastics describe the act of intellection as an activity developing - starting, happening, and ending - exclusively within the intellective power. There are of course significant differences between Suárez’ s and Macedo’ s texts. The first rejects the Scotist claim, according to which there is no specific difference between the angel and the human soul. 36 So, at least on the surface, Suárez is not favorable toward the similarity between the angelic and the human mind. Nevertheless, when, in the same text, the Jesuit elaborates on the possibility of grasping knowledge of the singulars, not only does he side with Scotus, from whom he borrows both examples and arguments ; 37 but he also describes the process of grasping knowledge of the material singulars in similar terms to actionem, sed habente se quasi materia, aut per modum excitantis animam, aut sane per modum exemplaris. Et ita fit quod statim ac anima per phantasiam cognoscit aliquid, per virtutem suam spiritualem quasi depingit rem illam in intellectu possibili. […] Intellectus agens ut sic nullam aliam actionem habet nisi productionem specie intelligibilis, quamvis haec actio diversis nominibus explicetur. Nota quod intellectui agenti triplex solet tribuit operatio : prima, illuminatio phantasmatis ; secunda, facere res actu intelligibiles ; tertia, abstrahere a phantasmatibus. Quarta etiam solet tribui, quae est illustrare prima principia. […] Nam, illuminatio phantasmatis non est actio circa phantasma […] illa est circa intellectum possibilem ; at vero circa intellectum possibilem nullam aliam actionem habet intellectus agens praeter specie productionem.” 35 Of the same advise Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 303. 36 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 1, n. 8, 74 - 76. 37 The examples made by Suárez are numerous and echo some of those present in Scotus’ s De anima. For instance : the human intellect can tell the difference between two individuals ( e. g., Peter and Paul); as human beings, we know individuals ; if the angels can know the material individuals, the human intellect must be able to know them as well (this argument itself is not from Scotus’ s De anima but from the text Macedo commented on : In II d. 3 q. 11). Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, nn. 7- 10 ; cf. Scotus, De anima, q. 22 ( OPh V), 230 - 33. It is worth observing that the only argument Macedo refers to is the one of the similarity between angelic and human intellect. Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 193 those Macedo will use in his account of angelic cognition. 38 Distancing himself from the Aristotelian (then Thomist) claim, according to which the intellect knows beings qua universals, whereas the senses know beings qua singulars, 39 Suárez, employing a list of arguments, proves that the human intellect is indeed able to cognize singulars. One of these arguments asserts that if the angelic intellect, which is further away from matter than the human one, knows material singular things, then the human intellect must be able to know them as well. 40 This argument, based on the similar structure of the two intellects, is offered by Suárez as evidence of the material singular’ s knowability. The similarity between the angelic and the human mind is, therefore, not rejected in toto by Suárez, who takes on this argument from Scotus and does not even spend time discussing it ; that the human intellect can know the material singulars, “as is clearly the case with the angels” ( ut in angelis patet), is presented as evidence. 41 Without entering into the details of Suárez’ s text, it is worth noticing that according to the Jesuit the cognition of the material singular is acquired by the intellect through the already mentioned mechanism of sympathy, namely through the concomitant activity of the intellect and the sensitive faculty, which results in the production of an intelligible species of the cognitive object. The intellect has the power to dematerialize the material individual outside the mind, if such cognition is supported by the concomitant acquisition of knowledge of that individual by the sensitive faculty. This is the measure of the intellect’ s dependence on the phantasms, according to Suárez. 42 The human acquisition of the material singulars cannot be compared to the intuitive cognition that Duns Scotus talks about, because such acquisition of knowledge is acquired from the external objects through abstraction and is, almost by definition, discursive, 38 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, n. 3, 110. Regarding Suárez’ s cognition of the singular, cf. the clear work by South, “Universal and Singular in Suárez.” Most of the scholarship has focused on the proximity between Suárez and Ockham concerning the cognition of the singulars ; see for instance Alejandro, La gnoseología del Doctor Esimio y la acusación nominalista ; De Vries, “Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suárez und der Nominalismus ; ” Peccorini, “Knowledge of the Singular ; ” Noreña, “Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Universal Concepts.” I have claimed that more attention should be paid to Suárez’ s Scotist roots ; cf. Tropia, “McCaghwell’ s Reading of Scotus’ s De anima,”, and Tropia, La teoria della conoscenza di Francisco Macedo, 142 - 48. Of the same similar advise, see Aho, “Suárez on cognitive intentions.” 39 Aristotle, Phys., I, 5, 189a5 - 10 and Met., V, 11, 1018b31- 34. 40 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, n. 11, 122 : “[I]ntellectum esse potentiam spiritualem abstrahentem a conditionibus materiae, non tollit quin possit cognoscere res materiales cum omnibus conditionibus individualibus, ut in angelis patet. Solum ergo potest inferri quod species, per quam intellectus cognoscit singulare, debet esse spiritualis, cum quo stat quod sit repraesentativa rei singularis, ut ostensum est.” 41 See previous note. 42 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 7, n. 6, 202 - 4. 194 Anna Tropia since it is and is not immediately at the disposal of the mind. 43 Nevertheless, Suárez, as many of his predecessors and contemporaries, is against the idea that material singulars are not directly intelligible by the human intellect. In a more sustained way than Macedo, the Jesuit reappraises Scotus’ s overall discourse on the state of the intellect and its temporary - though diminished - dependence on the phantasms. 44 One important outcome of Macedo’ s comparison with Suárez is that at least in one case - the cognition of the material singulars - the functioning of the human intellect can be clarified by the example of the angelic one. There are points in common between the two kinds of mind, owing to their immateriality. Furthermore, the insistence on the necessary separation between the intellect and the senses is a central motive in both authors’ account of human cognition. The superiority of the intellect and its prior role in the acquisition of cognition was also highlighted by other Jesuits, who are less well-known today than Suárez. This is the case with the Spaniard Juan Maldonado, who inaugurated the chair of philosophy in Paris from the very beginning of the College de Clermont in 1564. Maldonado precedes in time both Suárez and Macedo, but equally argues against any interaction between the intellect and the senses. In contrast to Suárez and Macedo, though, the incompatibility of intellect and senses is what moves Maldonado to reject in toto the species theory. According to Maldonado, the acts of intellectual cognition are direct. According to philosophy, a spiritual thing can never be generated by a bodily one. Also, if [material species ] are made spiritual, they are still made of the same matter from 43 Moreover, Suárez has a complex account of cognition of the material substances. He claims the intellect first grasps the singular accidents belonging to the substance, and only after “reconstructs” the concept of the underlying substance. See, e. g., Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 4, n. 2, 154 : “Species quae primo fit ab intellectu agente fit omnino similis in repraesentatione phantasmatis ; sed per phantasma tantum repraesentatur res secundum accidentia sensibilia per se ; ergo eandem rem et eodem modo repraesentat species intelligibilis facta ab intellectu agente. Maior patet, quia cognitio sensitiva est principium cognitionis intellectivae, nam determinat intellectum agentem ad productionem talis specie ; ergo talis est res repraesentata ab intellectu agente per speciem intelligibilem productam ab illo, qualis est cognitio per sensum et repraesentata in phantasmate.” I have argued that Suárez’ s account is close to Scotus’ s in Tropia, “McCaghwell’ s Reading of Scotus’ s De anima,” 103 - 9. 44 Although not explicitly : Suárez claims not to agree with Scotus concerning this precise point, although he reappraises many elements from his texts. I studied this in Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy.” See also Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 7, n. 8, 206 -8 : “[H]aec dependentia provenit ex imperfectione status, nam intellectus nunc non recipit species, nisi dum actu operatur phantasia ; phantasia autem et intellectus radicantur in eadem anima et ideo sibi invicem deserviunt et sese impediunt ; et ideo dum phantasia laeditur et insanit secum trahit attentionem animae, atque adeo intellectum ; et ideo laesio redundant in intellectum.” Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 195 which they come. This can happen only in two ways : either [ such matter] is transformed into nothing, or it remains without form. Both options are absurd. Accordingly, from the <material species> something would be generated. But that every time we think about something, a natural being is generated in our imagination is just ridiculous ; what would be generated in this way, a stone perhaps ? Furthermore, the agent intellect cannot make the material forms spiritual, even if they could [be made spiritual]: for, either it can transform them, or it cannot. If it cannot, how does it make them spiritual ? 45 The Jesuit’ s text does not contain any explicit reference to Scotus. However, its anti-Thomistic orientation is evident also in other cases, like in the cognition of the singulars ( something he shares with all the Jesuits and scholastics of his day ) and the entire account of the soul and its unity. Maldonado actually holds that singulars are what the intellect first knows and ascribes a certain actuality also to the material body - thereby taking on the famous “form of the bodyliness” (forma corporeitatis ) from medieval anti-Thomist philosophers. 46 Maldonado’ s short tract has a special focus on the immortality of the soul, that he aims to defend philosophically from the danger represented by the various forms of Averroisms that were spreading in his day. His worry regarding the intellect’ s independence from the senses - something he shares with Macedo and Suárez - is therefore mainly concerned with its separability from the body. Maldonado thus gives maximal attention to all the arguments that support the intellect’ s independence of the intellect from the body. This, of course, is reflected in his theory of cognition. The Jesuit in fact underlines that the intellect is free (libere ) to direct itself towards one or the other object, therefore cognizing it directly and by its own means, namely independently from the senses as well as from any species acquisition. 47 45 Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, 252 : “Res enim spiritalis secundum philosophiam numquam fit ex corporea. Praeterea si fiant res spiritales, de materia illa fiunt quam exuunt, quod fit dupliciter : aut enim convertitur in nihil, aut manet sine forma. Utrumque est absurdum. Ergo ex illa aliquid gignitur. Quod autem quoties intelligamus gignatur in imaginatione aliquod ens naturale, ridiculum est ; quid enim gignitur, lapisne ? Praeterea intellectus agens non posset illas facere spiritales etiam si illae possent ; aut enim aliquid ageret in illas aut nihil. Si nihil, quomodo facit spiritales ? ” 46 For the cognition of the singulars and the reappraisal of the forma corporeitatis, see respectively Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, 257- 58 and 239 - 40 ; extensive comment on the last passage in Tropia, “The unity of the soul.” 47 This is how Maldonado reconfigures abstraction ; cf. Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, 254 - 55 : “Multis autem rebus differt sensus ab intellectu. Primo, quia nunquam abstrahit a proprio obiecto sed ab alieno, ut aspectus non abstrahit a colore, sed ab odore ; intellectus, qui habet obiectum proprie infinitum, non potest abstrahere ab alieno, sed a proprio. Secundo, sensus necessitate quadam abstrahit, quia nulla potentia percipit alienum obiectum ; intellectus non necessitate, ut quando non potest multa simul comprehendere, separat, aliquando libere, quia vult unum et non alterum contemplari.” 196 Anna Tropia The same issues are present in the texts by other Jesuits of the same period, such as the Italian Girolamo Dandini (1554 - 1634 ), who held the chair of Maldonado in Paris in the last two decades of the sixteenth century. 48 In his massive and understudied commentary to Aristotle’ s De anima (to my knowledge, the first printed work issued at the Parisian Jesuit College ), Dandini too brings to the table the superiority of the intellect over the senses. In the footsteps of Maldonado, this worry leads him to eliminate the species - both sensible and intelligible species ; the intellect can be the storage space of its thoughts (its acts ) only. 49 Like Suárez, Dandini refers to the mechanism of the connection among the soul’ s powers to explain their interaction ( coordinatio facultatum ). The principle according to which nothing material (like the material impression stored within the sensitive faculty ) can be ever made material ( by the agent intellect ) is central and determines the Jesuit’ s entire account of human cognition. 50 In the three Jesuit accounts that have been rapidly presented, the problem of the impossibility of any interaction or reception of anything material in the intellect is central and determines the authors’ choices in their theories of cognition. Certainly, the mechanism of sympathy - which can also be attributed to Maldonado to make sense of his own account of human cognition - does not make the human mind the alter ego of the angelic mind. Nevertheless, the perception these Jesuits had that the introduction of such a mechanism is necessary, owing to the immateriality of the intellect, paves the way for a new conception of the human intellect with a strong emphasis on the intellect’ s autonomy and independence from the senses and their activities ; the intellect is gradually seen as more and more distinct ( separable, different, insofar as it functions in different ways ) from the body. 48 Regarding Dandini and his possible influence on other Jesuits, see Edwards, “Digressing with Aristotle : Hieronymus Dandinus’ De corpore animato (1610 ).” 49 Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, lib. III, comment. 81, 1892B -C : “A quibus [Thomas et alii] ego multis modis dissentio. Primum, intellectilem speciem nil aliud esse arbitror, quam ipsam intellectionem, quam actu promit intellectus, phantasmatibus inspectis […].” Cf. also ibid., comment. 95, digressio 29, n. 13, 1982B : “[…] specierum inanitatem ostendamus. In phantasmate namque satis est intellectui praesens obiectum, satis cum eo coniunctum, satisque ab illo intelligendum, tum provocatur intellectus, tum determinatur. Neque cogitandum est obiectum vera e propria in intellectum actionem agere ( quae enim sit vel etiam intellectilis speciei actio ? ) sed intelligendum, intellectum potius velut cognoscentem facultatem in illud vel circa illud operari, dum illud comprehendit et iudicat. […] Nulla igitur ante intellectionem esse in intellectu potest intellectilis species, aut post eam superesse : immo nil aliud est, intellectio ipsa quae est communis forma, quarum intellectus sit actu intelligens, tum res actu intellecta ; haecque vere in intelligentem transit.” 50 Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, comment. 95, digressio 29, n. 13,1982B -C : “Quare ut intellectus est naturaliter coordinatus phantasiae, sit phantasma illius optime comparatum ad movendum intellectum ; quique hoc neget, coordinationem facultatum harum negabit.” Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 197 Conclusion Let us now return to Macedo’ s treatment of intuition. As it has been shown, our scholastic follows Scotus’ s text ( Ordinatio II, dist. 3, q. 11) but allows himself to take some liberties ( cf., e. g., his ignoring of Scotus’ s distinction between the states of the intellect ). Macedo’ s main move is that of equating the angelic and the human mind : both reciprocally clarify and illuminate features and functions of the other. Take for example the case of the angelic cognition of the material singulars : instead of referring to Scotus’ s discourse on the intuitive capacity of the angel, Macedo explains how an immaterial mind - the angel’ s - can acquire cognition of a material individual object by basing himself upon the human intellect, i. e., an immaterial mind bound to a material body. The latter provides him with a solution through the mechanism of sympathy. Here, let us observe that Macedo does not talk about an act of intuitive cognition but refers to the species acquired by the angel, just like the human intellect does. But then what are we to understand by ‘species’? What is the species acquired by the angel ? One hypothesis is that Macedo emplo ys the term ‘ species ’ as synonymo us with cognition. In that case, the angel would understand the external and contingent objects just like human beings, through sympathy, are able to understand the external and material objects, namely without any direct contact with them (nothing material can affect something immaterial), through a sort of occasionalism. As for Macedo’ s sources, I have presented the hypothesis that Macedo derives his views from some Jesuits of the preceding generations. It is worth noticing that instead of focusing on the specificity of the act of intuitive cognition, Macedo completely turns his attention toward the possibility of such an act in itself. In his view, such an act can be clarified only by the comparison with the human mind. Bibliography Sources Aquinas, Thomas. Opera omnia, iussu impensatque Leonis XIII edita, 50 vols. Rome : Ex Typographia Polyglotta, 1888 - 1992. Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique. Rotterdam : Reinier Leers, 1702. Dandini, Girolamo. De corpore animato libri VII. 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