The Idea and Practice of Philosophy in Gilbert Simondon 

The Idea and Practice of Philosophy in Gilbert SimondonMichaël Crevoisier: Ontogenesis and Finitude10.24894/978-3-7965-4937-3 Jamil Alioui, Matthieu Amat, Carole MaignéOntogenesis and Finitude Remarks on the Marginality of Philosophical Thought in Simondon Michaël Crevoisier 1. Introduction Gilbert Simondon’ s position regarding the ambition of his theory of individuation is ambivalent. On the one hand, his discourse is cautious, presented in the form of hypotheses and postulates ; 1 on the other hand, it is formalised by means of a universal theory of operations that he calls allagmatic 2 and seems to aim for a new philosophical axiomatic. 3 This ambivalence can be explained by the nature of what he seeks to know, ontogenesis, that is to say, being insofar as what it is is not reducible to what is individuated but also consists in the process of individuation of beings. Indeed, the aim of his magnum opus, Individuation, is to grasp being from the point of view of the genesis of individuals ; his hypothesis is that the theory of allagmatics provides the means to do so because this theory developed a formalisation of the relationship between structure (the individuated being ) and operation (the individuation ). His idea is therefore to think that it is through the study of individuation that the theory of ontogenesis can be elaborated. 4 In the first pages of Individuation, Simondon shows that philosophers 1 See : Jean-Yves Château, “Analogie, science et philosophie chez Simondon”, in Canal-U, 2019, https : / / www.canal-u.tv/ 82307 (22. 01. 2022 ). 2 Simondon summarises this theory in a few pages in a preparatory document to Individuation published in the “Supplemental texts”, in ILNFI, pp. 663 - 673/ ILFI, pp. 559 - 566. In another preparatory document, he states explicitly that it is an “universal allagmatic” (“Épistémologie de la cybernétique” (1953 ), in SLΦ, p. 185 ). 3 This exposition of Simondon’ s position calls for a clarification. We agree with Chateau’ s assertion that Individuation does not fulfil the programme of the axiomatised theory of allagmatics ( see “Science and philosophy in Gilbert Simondon’ s work” in this volume ). Nevertheless, we think that it is still relevant to question their relationship because it explicitly appears that Simondon continues to want to carry out a systematic reform of philosophical conceptuality. In what way is this systematic reform aimed at developing a theory of individuation that is not axiomatic ? Why would he refuse or give up this axiomatic ambition ? There is an ambivalence in his work that could be interesting in itself because we wish to show that the Simondon’ s meaning of philosophy depends on it. 4 “[I]t is possible to consider individuation as what must be known beforehand about being”, ILNFI, p. 17/ ILFI, p. 35. have never been consistent with the idea of individuation. A true knowledge of individuation requires “a reform of fundamental philosophical notions”. 5 This is why the study of individuation implies a major ambition : a new discourse on being, a theory of ontogenesis whose outcome should be the uncovering of a new scheme of intelligibility of reality, implying a new philosophical axiomatic. 6 However, he points out that “we cannot know individuation in the ordinary sense of the term”, 7 so it is not certain that this new kind of “knowledge” can lead to a new philosophical “science”. 8 So, the theory of ontogenesis is thus a reform of the metaphysical ambition of philosophy : the discourse on being is no longer a priori a science of being, an ontology, but an ontogenesis. Because of this distinction, the status of the theory of ontogenesis is ambivalent : Simondon aims to establish a new structure of philosophical conceptuality in order to provide the means to think differently about being, but at the same time, he affirms that this new thought of being will not be scientific because : “It could be that ontogenesis is not able to be axiomatized”. 9 We will aim to clarify this doubt of Simondon : why can ontogenesis not be axiomatised ? Is it because individuation can only be known in a particular sense ? Commentators have already highlighted the particularity of this “knowledge” of individuation. 10 This particularity is explained by the coherence of Simondon’ s thought concerning individuation : a theory of knowledge of individuation implies thinking about knowledge from the point of view of individuation, and thus taking into consideration the fact that knowledge individuates itself. 11 However, asserting that knowledge individuates itself implies the idea that the knowing subject individuates itself by knowing. In other words, knowledge is an operation that modifies the subject. But, if the subject is no longer the same before and after the operation of knowledge, this raises a problem concerning the 5 Ibid. 6 The result of this conceptual reform lies mainly in the possibility of a way out from what Simondon calls the hylomorphic scheme, thanks to the development of new concepts, in particular those of metastability, internal resonance, causal recurrence, modulation and a new method based on the notion of transduction. 7 ILNFI, p. 17/ ILFI, p. 36. 8 However, there is an ambivalence because Simondon states in the first sentence of the “Allagmatic” (ILNFI, p. 663/ ILFI, p. 559 ) that the allagmatic theory, thanks to which the study of individuation should make it possible to elaborate the ontogenesis theory, belongs to the order of sciences. 9 ILNFI, p. 256/ ILFI, p. 228. 10 See : Jean-Hugues Barthélémy, Penser la connaissance et la technique après Simondon, Paris, L’ Harmattan, 2005. 11 Strictly speaking, this means that Simondon must elaborate an ontogenesis theory based on new concepts that are themselves the result of the individuation of Simondon’ s thought based on his reflection on what his study of the notion of individuation allows him to discover. 162 Michaël Crevoisier foundation of knowledge which should remain the same in order to guarantee the necessity of knowledge. More precisely, this is necessary in a Kantian perspective, but Simondon seems to adopt this perspective since he defends the idea that the validity of knowledge presupposes the identification of a universal subjective foundation, i. e. the a priori structure of a “transcendental subject”. 12 But the theory of individuation seems to be contradictory with the search for such a foundation. We want to question this apparent contradiction by examining the ontogenesis theory of the knowing subject developed by Simondon. From the point of view of ontogenesis, the subject is never adequate to itself, and we will show that it is for this reason it cannot truly know individuation, and consequently Simondon (insofar as he is a subject too ) cannot complete the axiomatisation of ontogenesis. The subject can grasp individuation because he is individuating too but, for the same reason, some parts of individuation necessarily escapes it. Our aim will be to make this limitation of the knowing subject explicit by emphasising the ontogenetic “finitude” of the subject that Simondon thematises. In this way we can understand the function he attributes to philosophical thought : “perpetually marginal”. 13 We will begin by explaining why Simondon wishes to axiomatise the theory of ontogenesis, and then we will show that an ontogenetic conception of the subject allows us to understand why this is impossible. Finally, we will note that such an impossibility determines the meaning of philosophical thought. 2. Ontogenesis theory and axiomatic ontology First of all, we need to understand why the axiomatisation of the theory of ontogeny is not obvious in Simondon’ s work. At first glance, wanting to produce an ontology that consists in formalising a discourse on being in a coherent set of axioms does not seem specifically problematic. Simondon would not be the first to do so. However, from the point of view of the question of individuation, that becomes a problem. That is the reason why he clearly distinguishes ontogenesis theory and ontology. Indeed, the contribution of the question of individuation consists of leaving a structural conception of being. Being is not reducible to what is individuated, and being is not only individuals as results of individuation. From the theory of ontogenesis’ point of view, it is a question of affirming that, in reality, being consists primarily of individuation operations, i. e. what makes individuals individuate. On the other hand, it is not a question of going back to the principle of 12 ILNFI, p. 293/ ILFI, p. 258. 13 Ibid., p. 256/ p. 228. Ontogenesis and Finitude 163 all individuation, because such a principle would itself be external to individuation. Simondon’ s idea is to remain with the immanence of individuation : We would like to show that it is necessary to reverse the search for the principle of individuation by considering the operation of individuation as primordial, on the basis of which the individual comes to exist and the unfolding regimes and modalities of which the individual reflects in its characteristics. 14 The challenge of the ontogenesis theory is therefore neither to analyse the structure of being by establishing a list of categories, nor to identify the principle that precedes and commands individuation, but to formalise a theory of the operations of individuation. Thus, the ontogenesis theory sets itself the task of analysing the different modalities of individuation ( physical, living being, psychical and collective ) and the phases of being ( pre-individual, individuated, transindividual ). The ontogenesis theory is thus a discourse on being insofar as there is individuation, i. e. “through which the being becomes insofar as it is, qua being”. 15 In this way, Simondon does seek to know being, but from individuation theory’ s point of view, this involves newly questioning what is called “being”. It also involves a new questioning of what is called “knowing”. This is why Simondon’ s ontogenetic questioning presupposes that the reflection is situated beforehand of ontology, i. e. without presupposing either the meaning nor the possibility of an adequation between being and knowing. According to this perspective, ontogenesis would become the starting point for philosophical thought ; it would really be first philosophy, anterior to the theory of knowledge and to an ontology that would follow this theory. 16 This is why Simondon carefully avoid saying that the ontogenesis theory is about knowing being, but rather about “following” or “grasping” 17 individuation. However, the purpose of this “grasping” is to produce adequate new concepts to an ontogenetic understanding of individuals. And these new concepts are interesting because they allow us to develop new axiomatics. For example, Simondon insists on the concept of field, whose ontogenetic meaning he grasps by following its individuation in physical sciences, in Maxwell, then in psychology ( Gestalttheorie ), sociology and finally cybernetics. He defends the idea that the field concept makes it possible to unify the human sciences into a single ax- 14 Ibid., p. 3/ p. 24. 15 Ibid, p. 4/ p. 25. 16 Ibid., p. 319/ p. 278. 17 “Beings can be known through the knowledge of the subject, but the individuation of beings can only be grasped through the individuation of the subject’ s knowledge”, Ibid., p. 17/ p. 36. 164 Michaël Crevoisier iomatic, revealing the continuity of the psychosocial domain, in accordance with the unity of psychological and collective individuation. 18 But more broadly, some concepts cross all the modalities of individuation and thus seem to belong to the universal domain of ontogenesis. These transversal concepts are therefore not relative to a specific field of object, to a particular science, but they are the concepts that structure the ontogenesis theory that Simondon seeks to establish. We must therefore distinguish between scientific concepts, relative to a specific individuation domain, and ontogenetic concepts whose domain of validity is ontogenesis itself, i. e. the domain of being totalising all the modalities of individuation. Then, why is the ontogenetic domain not scientific ? Scientific concepts are knowledge insofar as their meaning is stable. So, these concepts must be individuated in the same way in the minds of scientists and must serve as a structure of thought for the development of new knowledge. Therefore, ontogenesis concepts could be knowledge if it were possible for the discourse on being to also meet a criterion of stability. 19 It is on this point that Simondon seems to have some doubts. We can hypothesise that, on the one hand, ontology can be formalised to the point of consisting of an axiomatic, i. e. a coherent conceptual structure from which all the concepts of a philosophical system can be deduced. But, on the other hand, there is a major difference between the structuring of scientific discourse and the structuring of philosophical discourse because the conceptual structure of a philosophy is usually the product of a single philosopher. However, Simondon notices there are intelligibility schemes that cross philosophical systems, and thus determines a common individuation foundation : he highlights this point with the notion of hylomorphism. But, the hylomorphic scheme is an a posteriori construction produced by Simondon, and not an explicitly structuring concept of ontological discourse in general. This scheme allows us to identify a certain stability in the discourse on being, but it would be an exaggeration to say that there is an axiomatic of hylomorphism shared by philosophers, as there was, for example, an axiomatic of Newtonian physics. Philosophy thus has a different status than sciences, even if it is possible that certain concepts cross different philosophical systems (more or less implicitly structuring philosophical discourse in general). In short, for Simondon, ontogenesis theory may have the ambition to develop a new scheme of intelligibility to replace hylomorphism, but this possibility is not comparable to the structuring of scientific knowledge. This is the reason why Simondon remains cautious and he does not set out ontogenesis theory as if this were a knowledge of being understood as a primary science. 18 See : Xavier Guchet, “Merleau-Ponty, Simondon et le problème d’ une “axiomatique des sciences humaines”. L’ exemple de l’ histoire et de la sociologie”, in Chiasmi International 3, 2001, pp. 103 - 127. 19 ILNFI, pp. 76 - 77/ ILFI, p. 84. Ontogenesis and Finitude 165 Nevertheless, we insist on the ambivalence of Simondon’ s position : on the one hand, it is clear that the ontogenesis theory does not aim to produce a scientific knowledge ; on the other hand, the ambition of this theory is to replace hylomorphism by producing concepts of universal value, i. e. concepts whose individuation would have no limit and thus, from one to the other, would make it possible to establish a continuity between the different domains of individuation. In accordance with this, the concepts from ontogenesis theory are not knowledge, “in the usual sense of the term” as Simondon states, but it would be an exaggeration to say that they are not knowledge at all. Let us not forget that allagmatic theory has a universalist ambition : the ambition to build a new universal domain thanks in particular to the concept of transduction. Transduction is both an epistemological concept that allows us to grasp the way in which new domains of continuity have been established in sciences, 20 and a gnoseological concept that allows us to think de jure of a universal domain of continuity, discovered by transductive thought as a method based on analogy. At first, the universal value of transduction is based on an epistemological postulate, 21 but it is as ontogenetic concepts individuate by transduction from one domain to another that the concept of transduction acquires its stability and thus its universal value. In this sense, the individuation of the concept involves a constructivism that Simondon claims. 22 In short, in the first stage, ontogenesis theory understood as a theory of individuation has an exploratory function, it is a question of following the individuation of knowledge in the different scientific domains in order to identify the new concepts corresponding to new representations of the reality of the individuation modalities. In the second stage there is a reflexive phase ; it is a matter of recapturing these concepts from a philosophical point of view and, thanks to the analogical method, of transferring them from one field to another in order to see if they correspond to a new field of continuity. In this way, philosophical thought can seek to construct a domain of universal continuity in which new concepts, but also new methods, can investigate the totality of reality and thus reform philosophical thought in order to establish a new axiomatic for its fundamental problem, which is to think being in its becoming. 20 See for example the analysis of the “domain of transductivity […] of electromagnetic waves”, ILNFI, p. 120/ ILFI, p. 118. 21 “The epistemological postulate of this study is that the relation between two relations is itself a relation.”, Ibid., p. 76/ p. 83. 22 Simondon explains this aspect of his method at the end of “Analysis of the Criteria of Individuality” ( published in the supplements to Individuation ). This text was supposed to introduce the book, but Simondon abandoned it because, in this first draft of his reflection, he had not yet reached the radicality of the questioning of individuation. This is why the way he writes seems less cautious. 166 Michaël Crevoisier In sum, for Simondon, philosophical thought consists of constructing new conceptual structures that allow individuation to be grasped : “philosophy intervenes as a power of structuration, as a capacity for the invention of the structures that resolve problems of coming-into-being”. 23 This “grasping” is not scientific knowledge because what matters is less stability of the concepts in the community of philosophers than the universality of the domain of individuation that their transduction allows to think. However, this conceptual structure, which makes it possible to think about individuation in general, does involve the ambition of an axiomatisation of ontogenesis. In this case, why does Simondon remain cautious ? Why does he assert that : “[i]t may be that ontogenesis is not axiomatizable”? We understood that the questioning of individuation, that Simondon develops, presupposes a precaution : before seeking to know being ( ontology ), we must ask ourselves what is the relation between being and knowing from individuation’ s point of view. This precaution means that we must first reflect concepts that allow us to grasp physical and living being’ s individuations, in order to transfer these concepts to psychic and collective individuations, to think about the individuation of knowledge in the subject. Indeed, strictly speaking, there must be a continuity between the different modalities of individuation. So, concepts through which we grasp the individuation of physical beings must also allow us to grasp the individuation of psychic and collective beings and thus to develop ontogenesis theory of the subject. In this way, it should be possible to examine the co-individuation relation between things and subjects, between what is to be known and the knowing subject. Our hypothesis is that it is in the ontogenesis theory of the knowing subject that we find the reason of the gnoseological precautions shown by Simondon. He discovers the knowing subject finitude by questioning the nature of this knowing subject from the individuation point of view. We will show that this finitude is the reason why the subject cannot claim to know being, and why the subject can only follow its individuation. 3. Ontogenesis theory of the knowing subject Before understanding how Simondon defines the subject’ s finitude, we need to outline his knowing subject theory. Simondon locates the de jure foundation of the universality of knowledge in subject’ s psychic structure, what he calls the “individuated being” of the subject, which he identifies as a “transcendental subject”. 24 A subject must be something absolutely fixed in order to remain the same and to be able to reflect the structure that it is. Simondon does not explicitly state this, but the concepts he uses to think about the legal necessity of knowl- 23 ILNFI, p. 244/ ILFI, p. 323. 24 Ibid., p. 293/ p. 258. Ontogenesis and Finitude 167 edge possibility refer to the Kantian theory of knowledge and the idea of subject’ s apperception. Now, the theory of individuation requires to think at the same time about the transcendental structure of the knowing subject (the individuated being of the subject which is “conditions of possibility of knowledge ) and that knowing involves to continue to individuate itself (the “individualization” of the subject). Simondon develops a theory of the “complete subject”, 25 in order to think the articulation between these different levels of the subject. The knowledge possibility is no longer to be considered only from the subject as a result of individuation, but also as a way for the subject to continue individuating itself as a knowing subject. The subject is thus both an a priori structure (“a milieu of a prioris”) and what individuates itself. We will show that the tension between these two aspects of the subject brings into crisis the subject’ s apperceptive unity, and this is the reason why Simondon thinks it is not certain that the subject may know itself. We assume that this finitude of the subject’ s reflexivity explains the impossibility of axiomatising ontogenesis. Firstly, in decisive pages about psychical individuation Simondon sets up the foundation of the theory that he will later call the “complete subject”. 26 This foundation consists of thinking the very subject reality as a relation between two modalities of individuation : living being individuation and psychical and collective individuation. Regarding the knowing subject, this means that knowing must be understood from the fact that there is a life of the subject that evolves from the biological reality of the relationship to the environment through which the conditions of its existence are structured, to the social reality which conditions its insertion in the world. The subject’ s activity is caught between these two conditions : the fixed structure of its biological existence which conditions its de jure possibility of experience (the subject’ s individuated being ) and the structure of the social world which conditions its de facto possibilities of realising experiences (the individualisation of the subject). However, the articulation of these two levels between which the subject individuates itself is not so easy to analyse. The ( empirical) subject makes experiences which are not simply actualisations of what he can do according to the structure of its individuated being (transcendental). Simondon insists on that point. In some particular experiences, the subject feels its own structure as a problem, it feels “phase-shifted”, this experience is “overflowing”, so that its own existence may appear as impossible, incompatible with what it is as a living being. This is the reason why, while continuing to individuate psychically and collectively, the subject discovers within itself a tension between what it is and what it becomes. This tension is not an accidental difficulty that would be resolved in the normal course of existence, but rather a tension that fundamentally charac- 25 Ibid., p. 348/ p. 310. 26 Ibid., pp. 257- 260/ pp. 192 - 194. 168 Michaël Crevoisier terises the subject as a problem : “the transcendental subject is that through which there is a problem”. 27 The subject is this individual who is aware that it is more than what it recognises itself to be when it reflects on itself. It feels its psychical and collective life overflows its biological life. Now, this subject’ s overflowing has gnoseological consequences. Secondly, Simondon insists on this idea : knowledge is individuation of knowledge, i. e. operation, and from this point of view, it is necessary to understand why the subject seeks to know, before critically analysing limits of its power of knowledge. The subject’ s overflow explains why it seeks to know. Indeed, Simondon’ s answer seems to start from an observation : everything happens as if the subject ( unlike an individual which was simply a living being ), was looking for itself. But why does the subject seek to know itself ? This search does not correspond to a vital need, its problem is no longer to explore the world in order to find the means to live, but nor does it correspond to a metaphysical need that would be inscribed in the nature of human reason. Rather, the subject discovers the meaning of the world for its existence to make sense. Simondon discovers that the experiences of the subject can lead it to be more than it is. Indeed, having experiences is not only to actualise possibilities of being but also to invent new ones. The subject then understands it is not identical to itself, its relations to the world participate in what it is. 28 This is the reason why the subject experiences itself as a problematic being : when it reflects on itself it does not discover the synthetic unity of a being whose possible experiences are adequate to the structural conditions of what it can be, but it discovers a problematic difference between the structure that conditions its individualisation (the transcendental schemes of its mind ) and what it actually becomes (its empirical characteristic ). The subject is phase-shifted with itself. This phase-shift, this internal difference, is not secondary but already given because it is the principle of its reflexivity : the subject reflects itself because its being is problematic. 29 27 Ibid., p. 293/ p. 265. 28 From the individuation point of view, the definition of the individual explains this definition of the complete subject : “the individual is not considered identical to the being ; the being is richer, more durable, and larger than the individual : the individual is individual of the being, individual taken out of the being, not the primordial and elementary constituent of the being ; it is a manner of the being, or rather a moment of the being”, Ibid., p. 361/ p. 310. 29 The subject is called into question for two different reasons. 1) This kind of self-questioning comes from the outside, that starts from sensation, that is to say from the objective orientation given by the environment : “the problematic that exists on the level of sensation is a problematic of orientation according to an axis that is already given”. Therefore “there is a manner in which the being is called into question by the world that is anterior to any consistency of the object”, Ibid., p. 286 - 287/ p. 258. 2 ) A self-questioning which comes from within : it is the subject’ s affectivity, the subject’ s relationship with itself, that is at stake. It is no longer a question of orienting oneself in space, but in becoming. The problem is no longer knowing where to go, Ontogenesis and Finitude 169 Thus, the transcendental subject as a problem does consist of a dynamic : the empirical subject becoming aware of its psychical existence. This dynamic shatters the subject’ s apperception. Indeed, the phase-shifting is primary. In the order of the individuation’ s level, the subject appears when it individuates psychically, that is to say when it begins to live in relation to a world of meanings constructed by others and itself. But, in a sense, it is already too late, it has already begun to construct itself in excess of what it is and can no longer find itself in what it does. Its subject is doomed to live itself psychically, and therefore to know itself as a problematic being. The world invites it, at every moment, to exist beyond its condition, to become what no one has ever been, to give new meaning to the fact of living, as it risks, by existing beyond what it can live, to reach such a degree of incompatibility that it would die. In short, Simondon’ s theory of individuation develops a new explanation for the desire to know : the subject seeks to know because it is never itself. By seeking to know itself, the subject discovers a structure, what it is, an individual, but this structure is problematic because overwhelmed by the world through which the subject becomes other than what this structure determined it to be : “the subject is individual and other than individual ; it is incompatible with itself”. 30 And the more the subject explores the world, the more it digs into the internal difference of the selfness. Existence is a forever unsolved problem, which means that the life we lead is merely the endless construction of a solution to an unsolvable problem : Simondon writes that the subject is a “self-constitutive dynamism” “that constructs itself and conditions itself”, that poses “a problematic without a solution […] given in experience”. 31 Therefore, the subject is problematic because what it does overflows what it is. This problematic characteristic means that the subject’ s apperception is just substantialism abstraction ; in reality, it is impossible, it cannot know the synthetic unity of its being, nevertheless it can grasp this problematic tension between what it is and what it can become. In this sense, Simondon’ s contribution is to consider this problematic characteristic of the subject not as a difficulty to be solved, but as a reality to be thematised. Despite the “anxiety”, 32 the point is the solution is no longer exploration, but knowing what to become, how to be in the future : “this being is polarized in accordance with the world on the one hand in accordance with becoming on the other”, Ibid., p. 289/ p. 260. 30 Ibid., p. 280/ p. 248. 31 Ibid., pp. 309 - 310/ pp. 270- 271. 32 “ [I]n anxiety, the subject feels as if it exists as a problem posed to itself, and it feels its division into pre-individual nature and individuated being ; the individuated being is here and now, and this here and now prevent an infinity of other here and nows from coming into existence : the subject becomes conscious of itself as nature, as undetermined (ἄπειρον) [ apeiron ], and as something it will never be able to actualize into a here and now, that it will never be able to live”, Ibid., pp. 282 - 283/ pp. 250. 170 Michaël Crevoisier to admit internal difference of the individual, rather than trying to think about its resolution. This difference is problematic, but this problematic is the complete subject as a relation between two phases of being : individuated being ( structure ) and individuating being ( operation ). The ontogenetic theory’ s stake is to reflect on its problematic in order to construct a new understanding of the subject in the continuity of the conceptual structure that the study of physical and vital individuations has begun to establish. The stake of the subject’ s self-reflexivity is no longer to find in the subject a fundamental synthetic unity in order to solve the problem of apperceptive identity, but to grasp this gap, this internal difference of the subject as a problematic that characterises the dynamics of its activity. 33 This point seems crucial to us because it designates the transformation that Simondon makes in relation to the Kantian subject or, more broadly, to the paradigm of the cogito, i. e. of a subject defined as identical to itself. This transformation does not invalidate the legal foundation of knowledge because the subject remains, partly, an individuated being, the given result of a vital individuation. But this is only one aspect of the subject : the individual subject is only a “moment of the being” 34 of the complete subject. In other words, the subject can know itself only when it seeks a fixed structure, an eternal form. In this sense, a structural conception of the subject allows to think of a continuity between the knowledge produced by the sciences of structures and philosophical reflection. But, by focusing on the recent appearance of certain sciences of operations, Simondon highlights a discontinuity with the state of philosophical reflections and the need for a reform of the subject theory. 35 Now, by completing the subject theory through taking into consideration the operations of individuation that characterise it, the subject appears problematic, i. e. as a structure that is perpetually phase-shifted. Therefore, the point is to understand that our psychosocial life leads us to experiences that go beyond what we are. The subject’ s life is worth living insofar as it individuates 33 J.-H. Barthélémy emphasises this point in his reading of Simondon. He shows his originality (in relation to Kant and Husserl ) is to succeed, thanks to the concept of phase-shifting, in thinking the subject’ s temporal being not as a subjective form, but as a dimension of an individuation that is not centrally subjective : the subject being caught in the temporality of the individuation of being. Therefore, J.-H. Barthélémy develops the notion of “décentrement” to explains the Simondonian subject concept and he concludes to a new philosophical position, which he calls “Philosophical Relativity”, Barthélémy, op. cit., p. 46. 34 Ibid., p. 360/ p. 310. 35 This delay of the philosophy of the subject appears clearly at the end of the “History of the Notion of the Individual”, Ibid., p. 650 f./ p. 499 f. Simondon shows how in the German Romantics (in particular Fichte, Schelling and Hölderlin ) the concepts of field and recursivity are already transforming what philosophy in general has still not taken into account. Ontogenesis and Finitude 171 itself beyond any resolution, in the direction of a perpetual individuation. 36 In other words, the solution must not be a resolution, but an overflowing towards another problematic. The subject’ s overflowing must therefore be understood as a possibility of overcoming. For Simondon, the subject’ s existence consists in overcoming the problematic that it is by constructing itself, as a “personality”, beyond ( and through ) the internal difference that undermines it. It is not a matter of cancelling this difference because, for Simondon, the overcoming is not dialectical in the sense of Hegel. The difference persists as an internal tension of the subject, but the subject maintains itself in spite of this difference by overcoming (in a specific sense ) the tension through the structuring of its problematic being. Indeed, the subject’ s own characteristic is to be able to overcome the problematic of its being by considering it not as the end of a unity but on the contrary as what constitutes it structurally. In sum, the subject has experiences that reveal the problematicity of its being, but these experiences at the same time overflow it and structure itself as personality, i. e. as a singular individual : “The individualised being tends toward singularity and incorporates the accidental as singularity”. 37 In other words, the problematicity of the individuated being must be understood according to an internal dynamism of overcoming which means that subject’ s crises are some moments of refoundation. The individual problematic is beyond the relationship between the being and its environment ; this problematic requires solutions by overcoming, not by reducing a gap between a result and a goal. The individual problematic must only be solved by constructions, by increasing information according to a divergent determinism […] the individual is a being in which the accomplishment of the operation reacts on the axiomatic, by intense crises which are a refounding of the being. 38 36 Simondon’ s subject theory is also an ethical theory because he considers the question of knowledge should not be parted from action, and therefore an “axiontology” should be developed. From this point of view “ethics is that through which the subject remains subject […] Ethics expresses the meaning of perpetuated individuation”, Ibid., p. 380/ p. 335. 37 Ibid., p. 294/ p. 258. 38 “Note complémentaire sur les conséquences de la notion d’ individuation”, in ILFI, p. 346 ( our translation ). In this passage, Simondon distinguishes the living being from the machine. The characteristic of the living being lies in the effect of its operations on the structure. This exchange ( between operation and structure ) is central to the allagmatic theory. In METO, Simondon takes up this distinction by emphasising the “plasticity” of memory in the living being and he summarises his thought in one sentence : “the a posteriori becomes a priori”, METO, p. 138/ MEOT, p. 172. This point has often been commented on ( see : Baptiste Morizot, Pour une théorie de la rencontre. Hasard et individuation chez Gilbert Simondon, Paris, Vrin, 2016, p. 130 ; and Yuk Hui, Recursivity and Contingency, London, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, p. 194 ). These readings are right to emphasise the originality of this plastic conception of the a priori, but tend to apply this definition of the living being to the subject. Of course, Simondon 172 Michaël Crevoisier In other words, the subject constructs itself by determining its problematic’ s structure. We also understand this structuring is a “refoundation of being”, i. e. a new way of determining who the subject is as a psychical and social person. This point is important because Simondon indicates it corresponds to the axiomatics of the subject. So, the subject’ s axiomatisation means that by reflecting itself the subject is not condemned to be collapsed into the anxiety of being problematic, but it can “incorporate” what overflows it. This “incorporation” means that these overflowing experiences are then no longer understood as accidental, contingent, but constitutive of what it is insofar as it is also in relation with the world, i. e. living with others in a given situation. Thus, axiomatisation is the result of the subject’ s reflection on this operation of incorporation : the awareness of the structure of the problematic that characterises its existence. However, it would be too quick to conclude the subject constructs or transforms its axiomatics itself, because that would be to give too much power to reflection. However, the subject’ s axiomatic is not given a priori, it is not discovering what it already is. 39 In order to understand why Simondon asserts more generally that ontogenesis is not axiomatisable, we have to go into detail about the status he gives to the axiomatisation operation. The difficulty is that axiomatics has both an ontological reality (the structure that conditions the individual being’ s possibilities ) and a gnoseological validity (the concepts through which it is possible to represent the individual being ). Simondon’ s constructivism does not consist in confusing these two aspects, the reflection is not autopoietic, but it is nevertheless necessary to think their articulation. This is the reason why Simondon distinguishes between implicit axiomatics ( present in being ) and reflected axiomatics (knowledge of being ). Thought comprises clear, separate structures, such as representations, images, certain memories, and certain perceptions. All these elements, however, participate in a ground that gives them a direction, a homeostatic unity, and which acts as a vehicle for informed moves away from the anthropological cut between animal and man, nevertheless we think the subject is not reducible to a living being insofar as it is a knowing subject. There is a transcendental moment of the living subject that implies thinking about the fixity of the a priori, without which its axiomatics would be too plastic and could not be considered as a foundation of knowledge. In this sense, our reading of the Simondonian concept of the a priori takes the opposite view to that proposed by J.-H. Barthélémy, who sees in it an exit from Kantian fixity ( Barthélémy, op. cit., p. 52 f.). 39 In some texts, Simondon states axiomatics is “discovery”, but we understand that this discovery is at the same time a process of incorporation, in other words that this discovery is not a simple revelation, it is also what brings about a structuring : “The individuation that is life is conceived as the discovery in a conflictual situation of a new axiomatic that incorporates and unifies all the elements of this situation into a system that contains the individual”, ILNFI, p. 10/ ILFI, p. 30. Ontogenesis and Finitude 173 energy from one to the other and among all of them. One could say that the ground is the implicit axiomatic ; in it new systems of forms are elaborated. Without the ground of thought, there would be no thinking being, but rather an unrelated series of discontinuous representations. This ground is the mental milieu associated with the forms. 40 We understand that the axiomatic is already implicitly in the matter of thought, i. e. in the pre-individual reality of the subject’ s complete being. The pre-individual is never absolutely indeterminate because in reality it is always relative to the individuation of a structure. Therefore, an individual cannot structure itself into everything. The experiences of the subject overflow it and so transform it, but these transformations are not absolutely free, they are conditioned by what these experiences newly give to know. In other words, the subject’ s pre-individual reality already forms a system with what the subject does not yet know. Hence the overflowing experiences, through which he will newly know, are oriented : “this implicit axiomatic is constituted by the relation that exists between the reality to be known and the knowing subject, i. e., by the primary status of the reality to be known”. 41 The concept of “implicit axiomatics” helps us to understand that the solution is actually already in the subject who discovers itself as a problematic being. This solution is not a resolution of its problematic being, which will persist, but is its overcoming towards a new structuring of this problem. 42 In other words, from a gnoseological point of view, the transcendental subject always remains a moment of the subject’ s being. But this must be understood by distinguishing between the subject’ s problematic and its axiomatisation. The transcendental subject is this kind of structure which appears problematic for the subject itself, because the subject is aware that its experiences are overflowing that which it is. Whereas axiomatics is the determination of this structure that the knowing subject wishes to establish in order to elucidate the universal subjective foundation of knowledge. So, self-knowledge as a problem consists in the elucidation of a 40 METO, p. 62/ MEOT, p. 74. 41 METO, p. 240/ MEOT, p. 318. 42 We can specify that the subject is double : on the one hand it is the problem, on the other hand, through its reflective activity, it carries the solution. Reflection makes it possible to elucidate the problem’ s structure, but Simondon adds that this elucidation is at the same time a determination of this problem. By reflecting itself, the subject determines itself as a particular problem. “[T]he individual exists the moment that a reflexive becoming-conscious of the posed problems has allowed the particular being to introduce its idiosyncrasy and its activity (including that of its thought) into the solution ; the proper characteristic of the solution on the level of the individual resides in the fact that the individual plays a double role, on the one hand as an element of the data and on the other hand as an element of the solution ; the individual intervenes twice in its problematic, and it is through this double role that it calls itself into question”, ILNFI, p. 310/ ILFI, p. 271. 174 Michaël Crevoisier new axiomatics. But why cannot the axiomatisation be achieved ? Why cannot the subject completely elucidate its structure and thus know itself adequately ? The individual can live with the problem, but he can only elucidate it by solving it ; it is the supplement of being discovered and created in the form of action that allows consciousness afterwards to define the terms in which the problem was posed. 43 We can therefore add that the subject always elucidates the problem afterwards. Then, the axiomatic that the subject discovers in self-reflection is never anything other than what it has been, it is only the past problem on account of which it has reflected. Axiomatisation is always axiomatisation of a past problem. By axiomatising it, the subject constructs a theory of the conditions of possibility of his new existence, but he also participates in the production of meanings for a new world. This new world is the source of new experiences that already problematise the structure that the axiomatisation discovers. 44 In this sense, axiomatisation always lags behind individuation. 4. Ontogenetic finitude of the philosophising subject Axiomatisation is an act of the knowing subject, but axiomatics also refer to reality, a structure’ s reality. The difficulty of Simondon’ s reflection lies in this ambivalence of the status of axiomatics : epistemic and ontological. We have seen that his constructivist position clarifies the meaning of axiomatics as part of the 43 “Note complémentaire sur les conséquences de la notion d’ individuation”, ILFI, p. 334 ( our translation ). 44 Simondon’ s developments on technique clarify this idea : the world is renewed for the subject. In reality it is not the world that is the source of renewal but the relation between the subject and the world, i. e. the technique. This is the reason why, at the bottom ( but we will not develop this point here ), it should be said that it is the evolution of technical systems that characterises the problematisation’ s dynamic : “We can therefore be assumed that the most fundamental relationship in which a human group is engaged is the source of the basic problematic by which the philosophical thought of every age and every society has conceived individual reality. […] it is in the most constant way relation to the world as humanity lives integrated in a world. Technique in its deepest and most universal sense is this relation ; technè signifies means and technique is the set of all mediations through which this relation is established. We can therefore posit that the state of technology is the source of the relationship grasped by the various philosophies as the foundation of the individual problematic”, “Introduction” (1955 ), SLΦ, p. 24 ( our translation ). In another text, Simondon states the link between technique and thought’ s transformation : “Through the intermediary of allagmatics, and even cybernetics as it exists today, it seems that new patterns are being developed in the relationship between the machine and man, and that man’ s thinking is being transformed as a result.”, “L’ objet technique comme paradigm d’ intelligibilité universelle” (1956 ), SLΦ, p. 420 ( our translation ). Ontogenesis and Finitude 175 theory of the subject : axiomatisation is a determination of the problem’ s structure that the subject is, it is the overcoming of the problem towards another structuring of the conditions of possibility of experience and of thought in general. So, there is a circularity between the problematic and the axiomatic, i. e. between the fact that a subject remains problematic to itself and the fact that it seeks to make the axiomatics of this problem explicit. The subject can reflect on itself in order to make explicit the axiomatics of its being ( and of being in general), but Simondon retains a distinction between being and knowing : the subject can axiomatise being, but it is not certain that being, understood ontogenetically, is totally axiomatisable. Indeed, Simondon’ s theory of ontogenesis is based on an idea that is difficult to grasp because it is circular : 1) being is on the one hand a problematic whose structure the subject can reflect upon and make explicit, and on the other hand 2 ) being is that which overflows the a priori conditions of the knowing subject and consequently renders it problematic to itself ; furthermore 3 ) it is because of its problematic being that the subject reflects on itself and desires to know. Simondon explains this circularity between the problematic and the axiomatic : the subject is always behind the problem it seeks to axiomatise because it is behind itself. This is the reason why the subject can only know itself afterward and therefore inadequately. But why should this impossible selfknowledge involve the impossibility of an axiomatisation of ontogenesis in general ? It is this point that remains to be clarified. In both cases ( axiomatising ontogenesis in general or axiomatising one’ s own problematic being ) the subject must reflect on the individuation of the being that it grasps analogically, i. e. on the individuation of its own thought. In a Bergsonian perspective, it is within oneself that the subject finds the outside of being. And what he finds is an overflow of itself : the pre-individual. Indeed, we have understood that being overflows the subject and this is why the subject on the one hand seeks to reflect it (to contain it, to incorporate it) and on the other hand seeks to know it insofar as it is such an overflow, i. e. from an ontogenesis point of view, as being in becoming. But it seems that this overflowing of being is both what invites the subject to know ontogenesis (to elucidate the axiomatics of the problem that is this overflowing ) and what prevents it from knowing it ( because of this overflowing the subject can only ever reflect itself afterward ). So, it seems it is for the same reason that axiomatics appears and that ontogeny cannot be axiomatised. In a sense, the condition of possibility of knowledge is at the same time a condition of impossibility. Simondon identifies the ambivalence of this a priori condition of knowledge with the finitude of the subject. 45 It is therefore by deepening our understanding of the ontogenetic finitude of the sub- 45 “[T]he axiomatic of every human problem can only appear to the extent that the individual exists, i. e. establishes a finitude within itself that confers a recurrent circularity onto the problem of which it becomes conscious”, ILNFI, p. 310/ ILFI, p. 271. 176 Michaël Crevoisier ject that we will be able to understand : 1) why the subject can reach being by reflecting itself ; 2 ) the reason why ontogenesis cannot be axiomatised. Firstly, the subject must reflect itself in order to grasp within itself the movement of individuation in which it participates, but in reflecting itself he overflows itself. This finitude of reflection is both what limits its possible knowledge and what allows it to discover the problematic of being, i. e. being is what overflows its own structure. Thus, ambivalence is inscribed in the structure of the act of reflection. 46 But, more specifically, Simondon situates the ultimate reason for this double structure of possibility/ impossibility of knowledge in the subject’ s existence. If the individual were posited as eternal, none of the problems that appear to it could receive a solution, because the problem could never be dissociated from the subjectivity that the individual confers on it by figuring among the data and elements of the solution ; the problem must be able to be freed from its inherence to individuality, and this requires that the individual only intervene provisionally in the question that it poses. 47 The subject is finite, in the sense that it is going to die, that is the reason why problems appear to it. “[I]t is only what dies that is alive” 48 said Jankélévitch, this means in particular that there is a life of thought in the subject because the subject knows itself to be alive, and it knows itself to be alive because it knows that it is going to die. 49 Here Simondon interprets this thanatological character 46 In another text, Simondon explains that the condition of reflection is twofold : subjective insofar as this incompleteness involves “internal tensions of the reflecting subject” (“Introduction” (1955 ), SLΦ, p. 22 ( our translations )), and objective insofar as reflection is related to an “original reflexive field” (ibid., p. 21). In this way, Simondon reforms the notion of reflection : reflection at the intersection of these two conditions, a double problematic, objective and subjective. Reflection is both an introspective act, the subject’ s return on itself to stabilise its own structure, and an act that passes through the exterior and brings with it the causes of its overflow, its destabilisation. The reflecting subject is both upstream and downstream of its own stability, in prey to the metastable nature of its being, which it soothes and stimulates, reasons and anguishes : “neither a priori nor a posteriori, but a praesenti ; it [reflexive thinking ] returns on itself in such a way as to be at once prior and posterior to itself” (ibid., p. 20 ). Reflection, as an act, is thus this individuating relation at the active centre of individuation of complete subject, where the movements of problematisation and resolution constitutive of the phases of its being intersect : “reflection is a particular case of a relation between a problematic and the different operations by which it can be resolved thanks to the presence of an already constituted but still incompletely balanced subject” (ibid., p. 23 ). 47 ILNFI, p. 310/ ILFI, p. 271. 48 Vladimir Jankélévitch, La mort, Paris, Flammarion, 2017, p. 666. 49 Ludovic Duhem comments on this passage and summarises : “The criterion of individuality is thus the living being insofar as it dies” ( Ludovic Duhem, “L’ idée d’ “individu pur” dans la pensée de Simondon”, in Appareil 2, 2008, http: / / journals.openedition.org/ appareil/ 583 Ontogenesis and Finitude 177 of the life of thought to explain the existential reason for the finitude of knowledge. The existence of the subject is the resolution of the problem of being, but this resolution just a “moment” of the being. The subject structures itself and by reflecting itself axiomatises its being, but this does not involve the resolution of the problem of being in general. For the problem of existence is its own, but we have seen that the solutions he can bring to it by existing, by constructing itself as a person, they do not cancel the problem. So, secondly, it is this persistence of the problem of being that reveals to the subject that it is a problem beyond him. The problem of the individual is not only psychological or existential, it is ontological. [T]he individual exists to the extent that it poses and resolves a problem, but the problem only exists to the extent that it forces the individual to recognize its temporally and spatially limited nature. 50 By reflecting on itself, the subject discovers a problem greater than itself and thus recognises its own finitude. From the gnoseological point of view, this makes it possible to understand that it is because of its finitude, i. e. because the subject is limited to its empirical individuality, that the subject can grasp the gap between what he can become and individuation in general, i. e. the potentiality of being. In this sense, the subject can construct its own structures, but the subject’ s life is a testimony of a permanent individuation problem that goes beyond it. The subject can grasp this problem which exceeds him, but what it constructs to grasp it will necessarily be a “moment”, commensurate with its individuality, and therefore incomplete. Simondon defines philosophical thought by this subject’ s reflection on itself who discovers a problem that exceeds its own individuality. In a sense, the individual is a solution to the ontogenesis problem, but this problem is the finitude of the individual, as “death is both the means of living and the impediment to living”. 51 This is what explains why, from a gnoseological point of view, Simondon doubts that ontogenesis is axiomatisable : it is a problem that goes beyond the individual. Philosophy is the name of the thought that poses and seeks to deal with such a problem. In this sense, philosophy is clearly distinct from science. The objects of science appear axiomatisable because they are given a priori as objects, i. e. as individuals to be known. New individuals may appear ( we have given the electromagnetic field example ), but the region of being ( e. g. the physical individual ) remains the same, as if it were a structure of being itself. Philosophical thought questions the individual in its universality, and therefore (30. 07. 2020 ), §20 ( our translation ). He also notices the importance of the reference to Jankélévitch. 50 ILNFI, p. 310/ p. 271. 51 Jankélévitch, op. cit., p. 666. 178 Michaël Crevoisier without an a priori region. Of course, Simondon inherits a thought’ s structure, 52 which gives him an order of analysis, but his aim is to identify the continuity which, in the end, concerns not the genesis of such and such a type of individual, but the universality of ontogenesis. It could be that ontogenesis is not able to be axiomatized, which would explain the existence of philosophical thought as perpetually marginal with respect to all other studies, since philosophical thought is what is driven by the implicit or explicit research of ontogenesis in all orders of reality. 53 Philosophical thought is marginal because what it is interested in is not a particular object. Even if the philosopher gives himself an object, the way he questions it confronts him with the impossibility of guaranteeing its stability. It happens that philosophy believes that it succeeds in obtaining this guarantee, in structuring its representation of being, and this certainly remains its goal. This is the reason why Simondon adds that it is “perpetually” marginal, in the sense that this structuring is only a “moment” of the philosophical thought individuation. The world changes, what a subject is changes, because being changes. Philosophical questioning has to do with change, which is why philosophical thought is aware of its finitude. With the allagmatics theory Simondon believes he has found a way to structure thought on ontogenesis, and his major contribution is certainly to have grasped the importance of the appearance of the sciences of operations to operate this structuring. But we have shown that the ontogenesis theory enables him to carry out a reflection on the subject that reveals its finitude. This ontogenetic finitude of the subject involves a limitation of possible knowledge (the impossibility of a complete axiomatisation of being ) and at the same time this finitude is the reason for the possibility of knowledge (the subject seeks to know because it is finite ). The philosophical thought’ s function is to recall this structure of possibility/ impossibility that subject’ s finitude explains. But this time, and we think this is Simondon’ s bravura piece, allagmatics shifts the relaunch of reflection because it enables us to grasp the circularity of the problematic and the axiomatic. In other words, Simondon explores new margins of thought and being, he brings to life the thought of being, by proposing a new conception of the articulation between problem and solution, operation and structure. As an individual, the subject has a universal structure, which is why it can know, but it has a universal structure because its ontogenesis proceeds from a universal problem. The subject can reflect this structure and make explicit the axiomatics of this problem, but this elucidation is a particular determination of the problem because it is relative to its structuring as a knowing subject solving the problematic of its 52 See : Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportement, Paris, PUF, 2013. 53 ILNFI, p. 256/ ILFI, p. 228. Ontogenesis and Finitude 179 own being. This is the reason why there is perhaps a kind of universal allagmatics structure, but it is only a “moment”, the one relative to the Simondon subject, relative to the resolution of the being problem that goes beyond him. 54 5. Conclusion We summarise our point by applying to Simondon’ s theory of knowledge what the ontogenesis theory of finitude has allowed us to understand about the philosophy theory. It is impossible to know individuation because to grasp the operation of a being involves that this operation takes place in the subject’ s mind, and this risks modifying more or less profoundly the thought schemas through which he can know. In short, “grasping” involves modifying oneself, whereas knowing involves remaining the same, without which the edifice of knowledge would never be stable. The risk of grasping (intuition ) is that the subject will drift, will be overflowed by the adventure of the concept. This is the reason why he must, at the same time, take himself again, i. e. reflect on what is happening to him (reflection ). But this “at the same time” is impossible : reflection can only take place afterward, after that operation has taken place in him. Intuition and reflection are two operations that are themselves in tension, so that the awareness of the individuation of knowledge in itself always lags behind the individuation of knowledge : when the subject reflects on it, the being of knowledge has already become something else ; when Simondon reflects on the current state of scientific knowledge, it has already changed, and by the time the structuring of a new domain of continuity takes place philosophically, i. e. reflexively, a new shift, a new gap from the scientific domain has already opened up. However, the ontogenesis axiomatisation is not useless. Without this perpetual invention of unified representations of the world, subjects would find themselves overflows, and so unable to make their orientation in the world compatible with the state of the world. Yet, in order to exist, subjects must structure themselves. At the same time, this perpetual delay is the driving force of reflection, which pushes the subject to get hold of itself in order to newly elucidate the problem of its existence in relation to the world in which it has to participate. Therefore, the adventure of philosophical thought must assume to follow this line, in tension between the finalist will to complete the construction of a total 54 Andrea Bardin crucially shows that the non-axiomatisable characteristic of ontogenesis involves a persistence of the transcendental problem : “we consider that ontogenesis as theorised by Simondon is the place where the transcendental problematic, eliminated ( but not solved ) as a problem of the a priori, comes back again and again”, Andrea Bardin, “Simondon : transcendantal et individuation”, in Rametta Gaetano ( ed.), Les métamorphoses du transcendantal. Parcours multiples de Kant à Deleuze, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 2009, pp. 209 - 210 ( our translation ). 180 Michaël Crevoisier representation of the world, and the impossibility of anticipating the scientific discoveries from which the objective conditions of reflection will change. Positive science is not the basis of reflection, but its discoveries are the cause of a phase-shifting that destabilises the subject’ s internal relationship when it reflects on what it teaches it about the world and nature. In this sense, knowledge individuation is doubly conditioning for the philosophical subject : both a condition of possibility and of impossibility of the philosophical task. On the one hand, by grasping the objectivity of the world insofar as it is scientifically known, and on the other hand by reflecting on the conditions of possibility of scientific objectivity, the philosopher finds himself condemned to this aporia : he must try to recapture what is known within him in order to universalise knowledge, but by such a recapture what he becomes already escapes him. In short, axiomatisation is necessary but its completion is pointless ; the adventure of transductive thought is an endless twilight, and reflexive re-grasping is the dawn of a past world. The noon of thought is never more than the midnight of being. Ontogenesis and Finitude 181